State and Dissent: Structure and Agency in the Development of Contemporary Chinese NVA

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Abstract

With the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party concluded on 15th November 2012 and the birth of a new Politburo Standing Committee, the Party thus completed its second orderly hand-over of power in more than six decades of its rule over this most populous country in the world, and today, the world’s second largest economic entity. Nevertheless, also mark the year 2012 are various other poignant events that further strain State-civil society relations in this vast country: the suicide of Zha Weilin, the mysterious death of Li Wangyang, the daring escape of Chen Guangcheng from captivity in Shandong, the Victoria Park commemoration of June Fourth with a record attendance, intensification of public protests – mainly related to forced demolition and relocation, industrial pollution and official corruption – apparently emboldened by the solution to late 2011’s Siege of Wukan and the continuing self-immolation of Tibetans since 2009. This paper explores the arduous development of contemporary Chinese nonviolent action (NVA) movements against the backdrop of these events. Seeing contemporary Chinese NVA not as a multiattribute concept, but a multiconcept construct covering a spectrum of civil actions with different ideological and strategic orientations, the paper analyzes the Chinese State-civil society relations with particular emphasis along the pathway of a State domination-NVA assertion nexus with due attention paid to its macro-micro linkages in particular from the interpretive perspective, taking into consideration the problem of structure and agency, taking cognizance of the central role played by individual political actors in giving existence to the system, and the inability for the causal powers of systems and structures to exist without the mediation through the Archerian human agency whose causal powers, in turn, are indeducible from or irreducible to the causal powers of society.

Keywords: Party-State, dissent, nonviolent action (NVA), racketeer State, democracy movement, weiquan, weiwren, domination, assertion,
constraints and enablements, structure and agency, reflexivity and reflexives, morphogenesis and morphostasis

**JEL classification:** H11, H12, K49, Z18

1. Introduction: Dickens Revisited

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way [...] – Charles Dickens (1812-1870), *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859), Book the First: Recalled to Life, Chapter 1: The Period

Charles Dickens described the years of the French Revolution as “the best of times” as well as “the worst of times”. The degree of social contradictions that has grown into a highly alarming proportion, not only from the perspective of the masses but also well recognized by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)\(^1\) as for instance reflected in the amount of spending on the *weiwen*\(^2\)-related efforts, in China today accompanied by, ironically, an unprecedented economic miracle not only from the Chinese perspective but also the global, since the tragic ending of the 100-day 1989 Tiananmen protests, has indeed made the transposition of Dickens’s well-known adage to present-day China much less preposterous than it might appear to be.

Indeed, in an unusual three-part article, “Hu/Wen de Zhengzhi Yichan 胡/温的政治遗产” [Hu/Wen’s political legacy]\(^3\), written by *Xuexi Shibao’s* deputy editor Deng Yuwen 邓聿文 – unusual because *Xuexi Shibao* 学习时报 (Study Times) happens to be a magazine run by the Communist Party’s Central Party School (which is presently headed by Xi Jinping 习近平, the new Party general secretary and presumptive incoming State president), hence the article is seen by most as possibly reflecting Xi’s views – Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 胡锦涛-温家宝 administration’s seven great achievements during the past decade are juxtaposed with ten severe problems it has been considered to be responsible for during the same period. While proclaiming China’s glorious achievements during the reform era as in the first part of Deng’s article posted on 30th August 2012 is commonplace inside and outside the country nowadays (the latter such as views popularized in the recent, tremendously successful works of Martin Jacques\(^4\) and Ezra F. Vogel\(^5\)), what is far from commonplace is the unconcealed tone of the severe criticisms in the second part posted on 2nd September, which was followed by the third part giving the author’s concluding remarks and recommendations. Expectedly, the three-part article disappeared shortly after posting.
1. China became the world’s second largest economy, just after the United States of America (US), in comparison with the 6th place in world ranking a decade ago. Beginning to enter the rank of middle-income countries, China has experienced an increase in GDP per capita from US$1000 a decade ago to US$5414 by 2011, with her poor population continued to drop to 120 million, thus building a firm material foundation for the year 2020 target of the achievement of a “well-off” (xiaokang 小康) society.

2. Suggestion of new concepts of development, represented by the “outlook of scientific development” and “building of harmonious society”. During the key juncture of China’s socialist modernization, such new concepts have led to the country’s remarkable developmental achievements while also serving to show that CCP is able to keep up with the times, reflect the demands of the era and provide guidance on development.

3. Beginning of advancement in governance openness and a sunshine government. A modern government is an open, transparent government. Only when government information and policy-decision are open and transparent, policy-decision errors and public servants’ corruption can be reduced and the government and people can get closer to each other to the largest extent, thus enabling the

Table 1 Achievements and Problems of the Hu-Wen Decade (Deng Yuwen, 2012)

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| major social bodies to anticipate government behaviour in order to build a well-ordered, well-regulated government and politics. Openness and transparency is especially important in terms of the government’s function in the Chinese society. During the past 10 years, beginning with making known to the public of information on the SARS epidemic, with regulation of government information openness as the sign, and making public of government budget as usual practice, with the development of new media as pressure mechanism, there have been certain improvements in the openness of government behaviour. 4. China’s entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) has fixed the process of the country’s incorporation into the world, making it impossible for the nation to return to the closed-door policy of the past. Although entering the WTO wasn’t an event occurring during the past 10 years, the persistence on the open-door policy during the decade and carrying out what had been promised have led China onto an “openness” path of no return, to be incorporated better into the world and to absorb the advanced culture of the West, in order to achieve the nation’s century-long target of modernization. 5. Preliminary results have been obtained in social construction. Social construction with education, health care, social security, housing and living assistance as the main during urbanization, leading to the transforming of China’s original urban-rural dualist structure into a tripartite structure of peasants, nongmingong and urban residents. 4. Population policy severely lagged behind reality, causing rapid aging in demographic structure. Child-bearing is a basic human right but the government has persisted in its rigid one-child policy during the past decade, leading to rapid aging in demographic structure which has adversely affected the nation’s economic growth and the enhancement of the standard of provision for the aged, as well as social problems such as losing the only child and gender imbalance, and one-child policy-induced trampling of the rights and interests of the masses that is happening day to day. 5. Administrative and utilitarian tendency of education and research has not been arrested but is getting more severe, thus killing innovative spirit and capability. While there have been remarkable advancement in education and research during the past decade, quantity has been emphasized instead of quality. 6. Environmental problems have not been ameliorated; instead, pollution is getting more and more severe. Rugged manner of development has resulted in sacrificing environment as the price to pay for economic growth. During the past decade, huge number of high-energy-consuming, high-pollution projects have caused severe damage and comprehensive deterioration to homes and living environment, leading to acute decline in quality of life and to even threat to life itself from pollution. In addition, environmental
elements is directly related to the people’s livelihood. It is also a requirement for improving income distribution, ameliorating disparity between rich and poor, promoting economic development and building a domestic-demand-led society. Over the past decade, while economic construction remained the core of policy implementation, social construction has also achieved remarkable advancement, such as the abolition of agricultural tax, remitting of school fees and miscellaneous fees at school, establishing compulsory education, canceling price hike of medicines, as well as the setting up of a social security system which, though still being low-level, is comprehensive in coverage, hence leading to very substantial improvement in people’s livelihood.

6. There has been rapid development in the process of urbanization. Urbanization not only has practical economic implications for China, but it is also a main guarantee for the nation’s economic growth in the next two decades. Besides, urbanization will also transform people’s mentality and way of life and its influence in this context is truly immeasurable. Hence, a major content of China’s transformation is that from farming civilization to industrial civilization, from farming villages to cities, and this has to be accomplished through urbanization. During the past 10 years, urbanization has been advancing problem-induced contradictions and conflicts have been on the rise and are becoming more and more acute.

7. Inability to build up a stable energy resource supply system. With a developmental pattern of high energy resource consumption, a country of such low energy resource per capita would need to be heavily dependent on external sources of supply. Without building up stable and diversified channels of energy resource supply during the past decade, and having taken only a rudimentary step to explore new energy resources, the country will be constrained externally which will in turn affect its overall development.

8. Collapse of social moral institution, ideological bankruptcy, continued dropping of moral bottomline, while personal profit becomes the target of all. Accompanying outstanding economic development during the past decade is the comprehensive moral decline, with the collapse of the old moral institution, bankruptcy of the ideology built up during the revolutionary era, while a new, modern moral institution for adaptation to the demands of the market economy and commercial civilization is yet to be built up and the construction of a convincing mainstream value system remains non-existent.

9. Haphazard and weiwen 维稳 style of diplomacy lacks holistic perspective, grand strategy and concrete train of thought. During the past decade, principles and objectives are not accompanied by strategic planning and agenda setting and will to implement. Constrained by the tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦 principle of
at a speed of more than a percentage point per year, with more and more peasants being bound into the radiance of market and urban civilization, resulting in the rate of urbanization surpassing 50 per cent for the first time, thus accomplishing China’s from-rural-to-urban transformation.

7. Proposing ideas and stances on international order; unprecedented strengthening of international status and influence. As a natural outward projection of the country’s composite strength and development results during the decade, China’s international status and influence have experienced further strengthening and diffusion over the period. The introduction of the concept of the “China model”, the discussion over the “G2” framework, and the elevation of China’s power and the strengthening of China’s voice in international organizations can all be seen as manifestation of its rising international status. At the same time, as a newly rising great nation, it needs to have its own opinions and stances about the international order. In this regard, China has proposed the developmental concept of a harmonious world and been working hard towards it, making itself a major force in pursuing international peace and development and upholding international justice.

“lying low and biding time”, the government’s haphazard and weiwen mode of thought in dealing with a whole series of international disputes has led to increasingly grim international environment for China.

10. Weak promotion of political reform and democratization – still a huge distance towards the aspiration of returning power to the people. This is the most important issue for China today. Exactly because of its being most important, solving the problem is also particularly difficult. Looking at the experiences of other countries’ modernization and China’s own situation, to go straight in one step to promote relatively thorough political reform and democratization is impossible, and returning power to the people requires a procedure that asks for careful planning and installation. However, the ruling CCP should at least give the people hope and show its good faith and sincerity with some concrete actions, instead of dragging its feet just because there are problems. During the past decade, although Hu/Wen has also been emphasizing on democracy, freedom, rule of law, and on advancing political institutional reforms, the real progress has been limited and promoting of democracy has been weak. In fact, the solutions to all the abovementioned problems ultimately boil down to the issue of political reform and stand or fall by the depth of political reform. Hence, the ruling CCP should show its courage by walking the first step of political reform and democratization.

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At the heart of such contradictions lies the ultimate project of a self-seeking State manifested in the single-mindedness in pursuing greater economic prosperity, sometimes dubbed “GDPism”\(^6\), a frenzied quest that is increasingly unfolding in recent years to be at a terrible social cost, resulting in no small measure from often unchecked power and corruption of CCP cadres, officials and princelings and pervading State-business collusion with little regard for both public accountability and corporate social responsibility. Such is aggravated by the suppression of *weiquan* (rights-defending) activism and persecution of civil rights activists in the name of *weiwen* (maintaining stability) and the alleged unwritten rule of exempting family members of high-level ruling echelon from crime prosecution for the interest of politburo solidarity and party-State legitimacy\(^7\). Such collusion in service of GDPism\(^8\) whose achievement in turn lends legitimacy to the regime is referred to in the two suggestions made in Lynn T. White’s study on China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines: “First, opportunities for political support by networks with effective power – sometimes mostly in the state, but often mostly in local business elites – cause economic growth or its lack. Second, such growth, if they can arrange it, strengthens those elites’ capacities as against rivals, in whatever type of regime they have.” (White, 2009: 9) Nevertheless, it would not be from a balanced perspective if all these aberrations and inhuman consequences from GDPism are blamed on State-business collusion and corruption, and the local governments’ *weiwen* overdrive. After all, many cash-trapped and debt-ridden local governments might have no choice but to heavily rely on developmental projects for their revenues\(^9\) in this vast polity said to be the world’s most economically decentralized country\(^10\) where the centre expects relative self-sufficiency of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level and the local governments are expected to be fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local economic development, and for legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Putting such context together with the country’s acute interlocal and inter-regional economic disparity, it will not be surprising to see inhuman forced demolitions becoming the rule of the day to make way for lucrative property development, or even manufacturing and mining ventures with little regard for human lives, labour rights and environmental consequences. Under such circumstances, these State actions of course unavoidably need to be coercive, leading to protests and resistance from the affected masses, which in turn lead to more repression in the name of *weiwen* including beatings, lock-ups and even murders.

Within such context, this paper sets out to analyze the development of dissent as political defiance or recusance in the form of nonviolent action (NVA) movements in contemporary China and their relationship with the
Party-State. Recusance or recusancy\textsuperscript{11} as used here alludes to the religious connotation of the Marxist dogma, or the similarities Bertrand Russell drew between Judeo-Christian eschatology and Marxist socialism: Dialectical Materialism/Yahweh, Marx/the Messiah, Proletariat/the Elect, Communist Party/Church, the Communist Revolution/the Second Coming, Punishment of the Capitalists/Hell, and the Communist Commonwealth/the Millennium (Russell, 1946)\textsuperscript{12} – a messianic legacy that the present post-Maoist CCP has retained in a modernized and improvised format: Mao remains on the messianic pantheon; a rejuvenated, increasingly catch-all and technocratic Communist Party continues to be the umbrella Church to all societal groups religious or otherwise; and a CCP-rulled, stability-above-all-else, high-growth economic and military leviathan constitutes the centre of the imminent \textit{Pax Sinica}, or to the ever unrepentant devil’s advocate at least “a spectacular vision of a happy hell” (Ryan, 1988)\textsuperscript{13}. On another note, similar to Rose’s claim with respect to the institution of government (Rose, 1983: 159), contemporary Chinese dissent could be said not to be a multiattribute concept, but a \textit{multiconcept} construct, whose different conceptual components could be encompassed under NVA which, as used in this paper, comprises both mass “political defiance” denoting a deliberate challenge to authority by disobedience including protest, non-cooperation and intervention applied defiantly and actively for political purposes (see definition in Sharp, 2010, adopting Helvey, 2002), as well as other types of nonviolent struggle and resistance. It thus covers a wide spectrum of movements both directly against State repression such as the wider democracy movement, the Falungong \textit{法轮功} resistance and the territorial ethnic minority resistance movements, as well as the \textit{weiquan} activism which only indirectly challenges State repression, in cases where it occurs, in its struggle for social justice. With this overall focus in mind, this paper proceeds along the analytical pathway of a State domination-NVA assertion nexus with due attention paid to its macro-micro linkages in particular from the interpretive perspective, taking into consideration the problem of structure and agency, the “double morphogenetic” scenario as portrayed in the realist social theory.

2. NVA and the State

Indeed, miraculous economic performance and urban modernization accompanied by uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often “lawless” local governments especially in the cases of the suppression of local civil rights activists and demolition of residential houses to make way for lucrative property development) have characterized the past three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform era. The problem is often blamed on Deng Xiaoping 邓小平’s maxim “let some
people get rich first” and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform. However, begging the question as to the glory of China’s success in the past decade is the apparent failure in establishing the rule of law under the Hu-Wen administration. The factors at work here could in fact be similar to the reasons why North Korea is so resistant to economic reform (Kim, 2012), for establishing a comprehensive framework of the rule of law could eventually harm the self-declared legitimacy of one-party rule, jeopardize the wenwen efforts, and destabilize the sociopolitical status quo that GDPism has so far succeeded to maintain. Zhang Wei 张炜, a senior research fellow at the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute, in a recent interview by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), rejected the popular claim that the Hu-Wen administration was responsible for the past decade of China’s unprecedented economic growth which he attributed instead to the economic reforms arduously engineered by earlier leaders in the 1980s and 1990s whose cumulative benefits were being reaped by the Hu-Wen administration. On the contrary, the Hu-Wen administration was characterized in the past decade by its lack of any substantial reforms in economic or political institution, as well as by the most draconian State control of society including the worst repression on civil rights activists and press freedom since the 1980s. Far from being comparable with earlier leaders like Deng Xiaoping or even Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Zhu Rongji 朱榕基 in terms of reform efforts, according to Zhang Wei, the Hu-Wen administration is directly responsible for the acute social contradictions resulted especially from spiraling income and wealth disparities.14

2.1. State as Racketeer and Power Asymmetry

We control life, Winston, at all its levels. You are imagining that there is something called human nature which will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature. Men are infinitely malleable. Or perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The others are outside – irrelevant.

George Orwell (1949), Nineteen Eighty-Four, Part 3, Chapter 3

Nevertheless, in the interplay between the State and the civil society, much like what Kristensen’s law in public choice theories postulates, the negotiation between human agencies tends to be asymmetrical. In entrenching and expanding its power, the ruling regime as a rule would resort to exploit such power asymmetry not only through the overt repression of dissent in the preservation of stability as an ongoing stalemate – one of the possible results of social conflicts from the neo-Marxist perspective – but also by forging and
re-forging alliances with societal groups based on common interest and the co-optation of the societal élite including segments of the intelligentsia. All these, of course, depend on the State’s ability to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. In this, China is not unique, as Charles Tilly observes:

At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.

(Tilly, 1985: 169)

While that brings to mind Thomas Paine’s iconoclastic dictum that “government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one”\(^\text{15}\), Tilly notes that apologists for a government usually argue that the government offers protection against local and external violence and these apologists call people who complain about the price of protection “anarchists”, “subversives”, or both at once. Tilly basically finds an analogy of such a government that perpetuates its power through violence, in one sense or another, with a racketeer:

Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes […] political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people’s desires and interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.

(\textit{ibid.})

On the other hand, the mismatch between the system segments’ relations and those of the human agencies, coupled with power asymmetry and one-sided monopoly of violence, gives rise to a situation in which social structural stratification leads to even involuntarily placed agents being transformed into social actors during the process of transforming the structural conditions affecting them – Margaret Scotford Archer’s double morphogenesis\(^\text{16}\) – while they are endeavouring to realize their undertakings and/or to guard their vested interests. In 1989 such a mismatch tragically ended in that Goya-esque landscape of the morning after that fateful night of 3rd-4th June which a leading weekly in its editorial saw as a staggeringly brutal stroke that shot through the heart of CCP that would no longer recover.\(^\text{17}\) Nevertheless, that poignant commentary seems today, by hindsight, to be a gross underestimation of CCP’s resiliency and the effectiveness of authoritarian power, and the importance of the constraints and enablements that depends
objectively on the relative social position of the human agents and subjectively on the agents’ projects which to a certain extent being adjusted to possibilities through what Pierre Bourdieu calls the “causality of the probable” (Bourdieu, 1974), given the stark asymmetry in power relations and one-sided monopoly of violence – the inhuman violence that typically accompanied the rise of the Communist Party to power whether in the former Soviet Union or China. Indeed, here in this East Asian landmass, the blood-soaked history of the CCP since the bloody purges of the so-called “AB” (“anti-Bolshevik”) League of the 1930s in the Chinese Soviet regions that claimed the lives of more than a hundred thousand people had continued throughout its reign (Gao, 1999; Hu, 2012). For instance, according to a Party History Publishing House (中共党史出版社) publication, by the end of the 1950-1953 “Movement to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” (镇压反革命运动), over 2.4 million “bandits” were liquidated, 1.27 million “counterrevolutionaries” were incarcerated, 230 thousand brought under surveillance and 710 thousand killed (Bai, 2006, repr. 2008: 494). However, placing these in the proper perspective, they are but minor incidents throughout the millennia-long blood-soaked history of the Chinese dynasties – may they be through State brutality, suppression of peasant revolts, pacification of the frontiers, conquests for the imperial realm, or even palace purges.

2.2. Grassroots Reactions to a Racketeer State: Emergent Currents of Change in Chinese Democratization

On the other hand, the democracy movement inside China which began during the Beijing Spring of 1978, flourished under the liberal Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦-Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 administration, erupted in a full show of strength on the streets during the hundred-day Tiananmen demonstrations, has since been ruthlessly crushed into non-existence. The dissident Xie Changfa 谢长发 was sentenced to 13-year imprisonment for his involvement in founding the outlawed China Democracy Party in 1998. He Depu 何德普, another founder of the China Democracy Party, lost his job at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences after standing as a candidate in local elections in 1990, and was given an eight-year sentence on 6th November 2003 for dissident activity on the Internet.

Hence, the relentless proscription of the democracy movement inside China and the ineffective and fragmented nature of the democracy movement in exile have rendered the democracy movement in general surviving in at most a commensal relationship with the CCP on which its impact has been and is increasing negligible and from which all that it draws is but strategic blasé mixed with probably genuine nonchalance and unconcern (see Figure 2). For instance, out of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize nominee18 Professor Gene
Sharp’s list of 198 methods of NVA (see Sharp, 2010: 79-86, “Appendix One”), just are there any that the Chinese democracy movement has been engaging in effectively or is in a position to engage in or organize effectively in the harsh political environment since the Beijing massacre 23 years ago? In this regard, the limited impact from the high-profile pro-democracy activists such as Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 constitutes an exception rather than the rule, as cases like this are doubtlessly more a result of foreign pressure (in the case of Liu, the Nobel Prize) rather than an impact from the democracy movement itself. While Charter 08 that Liu drafted and publicized on 10th December 2008 represents the first official document from the democracy movement within China that openly calls for constitutional amendment (Item 1) to pave the way for separation of powers (Item 2), legislative democracy (Item 3), judiciary independence (Item 4), free and fair one-person-one-vote elections for all public posts at all levels with no exceptions (Item 7), abolishing the present one-party political monopoly system and replacing it with multi-party free and fair competition (Item 9), freedom of speech (Item 11), construction of a federal republic under a democratic constitution, etc. (Liu, 2010: 403-409, Appendix)\(^1⁰\), and received wide support among the intelligentsia both within China and overseas, it remains little more than a theoretical paper that the CCP can easily treat with plain unconcern. According to the results of an Internet survey conducted during April-May 2012 by Li Kaisheng 李开盛, an associate professor at the Xiangtan 湘潭 University in China’s Hunan Province, recently released on the Gongshiwang 共识网, an academic thought website, a majority of the respondents were found to be favouring the Western, North Atlantic liberal democratic political system based on separation of powers.\(^2⁰\) The survey was conducted from 13th April 2012 to 13th May 2012 with a returned sample of 4,697. The conduct of this survey, according to Li, stemmed from his conviction that what really determines China’s future is not or mainly is not the thought of an élite minority, but the opinion and cognition of the majority of the masses towards the country and its society. His survey results show that among the political systems which the respondents were most in favour of the top five were that of the United State of America (71.98 per cent), Sweden (32.38 per cent), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (30.76 per cent), Germany (28.81 per cent) and Singapore (27.51 per cent). On the other hand, topping the list of political systems the respondents were most not in favour of were that of North Korea (73.62 per cent) and China (54.12 per cent), followed by Iran, Vietnam and Pakistan. Besides that, the majority of respondents viewed corruption, inadequate degree of democratization and social injustice as the biggest challenges facing today’s China, with 81 per cent of the respondents considering the problem of corruption as “very serious” and 17 per cent “relatively serious”. Putting aside the usual limitations of such on-line Internet
surveys, which in this case is further complicated by the fact that the posting of its results on the Gongshiwang had apparently been deleted swiftly by the website administrators\(^2\), the results have lent support to the well recognized subtle undercurrents going on in the scene of Chinese sociopolitical change – the subliminal changes surging beneath the State-orchestrated projectable changes which still continue to draw a line against adopting North Atlantic democracy and its *trias politica* (tripartite separation of powers) for checks and balances\(^2\), as shown in Figure 1 which is based on Reeler’s threefold theory of social change (Reeler, 2007).\(^2\)

Geopolitically (not used in an international strategic sense), a quarter of a century after Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 lifted martial law and virtually ended authoritarianism in Taiwan on 15th July 1987 on the one hand, and first open contact with mainland China in the same year, and 15 years after Hong Kong’s “Handover” to mainland China on the other, there have been surging contacts by the mainland Chinese today with their brethren in Taiwan and Hong Kong, not only via the Internet weblogs, *weibo* 微博 and twitter but increasingly in person through tourism. The possibilities for China no longer seem remote but truly imminent, as it is thought-provoking enough in witnessing their “renegade province” across the Strait today with a vibrant liberal democratic political system and a free and decent civil society brimming with vim and vigour and their Special Administrative Region where their Cantonese-speaking brethren are engaging in a zealous life-and-death struggle against Beijing’s encroachment of their treasured civil liberties. The latter region is unique in being the only corner of China under PRC’s jurisdiction where large-scale public demonstrations against China’s one-party authoritarianism are still possible, as manifest in the annual remembrance of the 4th June 1989 Beijing massacre, participated this year (2012) by a total of 180,000 people, and the annual “Handover” anniversary demonstrations, participated this year by 40,000 people, according to organizer’s figures, in defense of freedom and democracy, protesting against “party-official-business collusion” and calling for a thorough investigation of Li Wangyang 李旺阳's cause of death. Added to these sources of inspiration or models worthy of emulation are the images of the Republic of Mongolia (formerly China’s Outer Mongolia) where the human rights-respecting multi-party democracy is going strong since moving away from the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary (Communist) Party authoritarianism in 1991, Vietnam where political reform seems possible to be picking up speed and leave China behind, and Burma (or Myanmar, China’s erstwhile formerly junta-ruled client state) where the junta-dominated regime unexpectedly staged a volte-face with promising political reform and liberalization suddenly moving apace, epitomized by ending the long-running persecution of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) and restoring their political rights.
Figure 1 China’s Political Institutional Change since 1978: Institutions, Agents and Events

Projectable change post-1989: Deng’s nansuan brought continuous economic reforms leading to economic miracle; four cardinal principles reaffirming and upholding CCP’s political supremacy; thought control; resistance to bourgeois liberalization; Deng’s “stability above all else” directive led to Party-State’s ruthless wetten; socialism with Chinese characteristics; Party-State’s promotion of fundamental definition of human rights as just the people’s rights to be fed, to be sheltered, to be educated and to be employed; continued Dengist stance against adopting North Atlantic democracy and its trias politica (tripartite separation of powers) for checks and balances, promoting central State nationalism and cracking down on peripheral nationalisms; controlled intra-Party democratization, grassroot democracy: village elections, “stick and carrot” co-optation and control of intellectuals, building of “harmonious society”, central State’s tacit consent to local repression under the wetten pacification; crackdown on Falungong; becoming world’s 2nd largest economy while the reform, political dicta tabula ...

Overt emergent change post-1989: emergence of middle-class; rise of peripheral nationalisms – March 2008

Overt emergent change post-1989: Turkey’s democratization (December 2007); “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): relaxation on political and civil liberties; Zhao Ziyang’s passing (2005) and publication of memoir (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, interethic contradictions, anomie and social neurosis – school killings, “mass incidents”, dingshi and forced relocations; deepening corruption and guan-shang gongjie, worker suicides, plight of mungmingong; escape of Chen Guangcheng, suicide of U Ba Win and Li Wangyang’s allegedly “being suicided”, progress in political reform in Vietnam and Burma and the renaming of political rights for Aung San Suu Kyi symbolizing renewed hope for Burmese democratization ...

Subliminal or latent emergent change was occurring since 1978 through – free market returning, post-Mao return of entrepreneurship, geitihu, etc., bringing about subtle yet crucial society-wide socio-psychological change as prelude to change in political demands, Hu Yaobang’s passing (1989) …

Uncovering roots of crisis, unlearning preconceived ‘cardinal principles’

Overt emergent change post-1989: Taiwan’s democratization (December 1996); “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): relaxation on political and civil liberties; Zhao Ziyang’s passing (2005) and publication of memoir (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, interethic contradictions, anomie and social neurosis – school killings, “mass incidents”, dingshi and forced relocations; deepening corruption and guan-shang gongjie, worker suicides, plight of mungmingong; escape of Chen Guangcheng, suicide of U Ba Win and Li Wangyang’s allegedly “being suicided”, progress in political reform in Vietnam and Burma and the renaming of political rights for Aung San Suu Kyi symbolizing renewed hope for Burmese democratization ...

Creating a new situation

Turning point: Facing the real will to change: dealing with resistance to change

Alternative U-process of transformative change

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Creating a new situation

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Alternative U-process of transformative change
3. Domination and Assertion: Interpreting Chinese Sociopolitical Movements

Indeed, unless we choose to decentralize [...] as the means to producing a race of free individuals, we have only two alternatives to choose from: either a number of national, militarized totalitarians [...] or else one supra-national totalitarianism, called into existence by the social chaos [...] and developing, under the need for efficiency and stability, into the welfare-tyranny of Utopia. You pays your money and takes your choice.

Aldous Huxley (1946), “Foreword” to Brave New World (1932)

Since the brutal crushing of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations – which during a hundred days metamorphosed from originally being university students’ protests against public sleaze and corruption into unprecedented, emboldened society-wide rallies not only against corruption, but also for freedom of speech, press freedom, freedom of forming civil associations, labour rights and independent trade unionism, civil rights, rule of law and democratic governance, etc., which was essentially calling for reforms shaking CCP’s monopoly of political power – Chinese political dissent has survived essentially on two tracks. On the one hand are the exiled dissidents and their various organizations mainly based in the United States of America (US) that make up the Chinese democracy movement in exile in which many survivals of the 1989 crackdown are still active, on the other there are the rights-defending activists and civil society organizations inside China which are threading a thin line within China’s spurious legal environment, fighting to right the social injustices caused by rampant corruption, State-business collusion, and the weiwen preoccupation that places stability above civil rights and political morality, while trying to avoid challenging CCP’s political monopoly.

The history of the Chinese democracy movement in exile can be traced back to the June Fourth Beijing massacre of 1989. Many pro-democracy organizations were born during that tumultuous 100-day “Beijing Spring” and these included the China Support Network (CSN), Human Rights in China (HRIC) and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS). New groups emerged in the years following the massacre: the Party for Freedom and Democracy in China (PFDC) founded in 1991, the Wei Jingsheng Foundation and the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, the Free China Movement founded in 1998 led by Lian Shengde 连胜德, as well as the new anti-CCP news outlets formed at the turn of the new millennium – The Epoch Times (Dajiyuan 大紀元), the New Tang Dynasty Television and the Sound of Hope Radio – during the beginning of the crackdown on Falungong 法輪功. However, the core of the democracy movement in exile is mainly made up loosely of such US-based organizations like China Alliance
for Democracy, the Federation for a Democratic China and the IFCSS appears fragmented and suffers from internal disputes, factional strife and in-fighting, and has little impact against CCP’s continued one-party rule in China, owing in no small measure to the miraculous economic performance and impressive poverty reduction record of China since the bloody crackdown of 1989, the liberalization of the Chinese society accompanying the no-holds-barred market reform and increasing degree of intra-CCP democratization even while the party’s monopoly of political power remains ruthlessly non-negotiable.

3.1. Pro-Democracy and Civil Rights Activism as Credible NVA

The survival of democracy depends on the ability of large numbers of people to make realistic choices in the light of adequate information. A dictatorship, on the other hand, maintains itself by censoring or distorting the facts, and by appealing, not to reason, not to enlightened self-interest, but to passion and prejudice, to the powerful ‘hidden forces’, as Hitler called them, present in the unconscious depths of every human mind.

Aldous Huxley (1959), *Brave New World Revisited*, Chapter VI

Chinese democracy movement can be classified typically as an NVA movement, or a resistance movement of the NVA variety. This applies widely to the exiled democracy movement since the violently suppressed 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, its still relentlessly proscribed domestic counterpart basically surrounding the China Democracy Party and that galvanized action that was symbolized by the Charter 08 declaration, the issue-oriented but increasingly cross-galvanized civil rights-defending actions, the mainly exiled Falungong resistance movement, as well as the ethnoregional ethnic self-determination movements with certain extent of secessionist potential, especially the Tibetans’ struggle for ethnic autonomy. The Uyghur resistance has exhibited some degree of violence, undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the support from militant Islamic movements outside China, but by and large, such violent tendencies are still minimal and sporadic.

Nonviolent resistance movements have been seen by many (e.g., Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005; Ackerman and Duvall, 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Zunes, 2009) to be effective means in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. “The long-standing assumption that dictatorial regimes can only be overthrown through armed struggle or foreign military intervention is coming under increasing challenge …”, comments Zunes (2009) who identifies NVA as the most powerful political tool available to challenge oppression. Zunes attributes the high success rate of NVA to the absence of the terrifying image usually accompanying violent or armed resistance which can turn public opinion against a movement (on the contrary,
the State’s violent repression of unarmed resistance movement tends to create greater sympathy for the government’s opponents – bringing to mind the image of Liu Xiaobo smashing that rifle on the night of the Beijing massacre in 1989); the greater willingness on the part of the pro-government elements or the moderate elements in an otherwise ruthless State machinery to compromise with nonviolent insurgents, whom the former look upon as being less likely to physically harm their opponents when they take power; and the fact that NVA movements also increase the likelihood of defections and non-cooperation among police and military personnel who are less ready to shoot into unarmed crowds. While especially with the last point survivors of the 1989 Beijing massacre and the 8th August 1988 Rangoon massacre will beg to disagree, Stephan and Chenoweth in their empirical study argue that violent repression of nonviolent campaigns tends to

[...] recoils against its originators, often resulting in the breakdown of obedience among regime supporters, mobilization of the population against the regime, and international condemnation of the regime. The internal and external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are thus higher than the costs of repressing violent campaigns. Backfire leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating dissent and conflicts among the opponent’s supporters, increasing external support for the resistance campaign, and decreasing external support for the opponent. These dynamics are more likely to occur when an opponent’s violence is not met with violent counterreprisals by the resistance campaign and when this is communicated to internal and external audiences.

(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 11)

Nevertheless, symbolic protest actions as in Rangoon in 1988 and Beijing in 1989, while having a tremendous moral and psychological impact and arousing major national and international attention, as Gene Sharp reminds us, they are by themselves “unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the dictatorship” (Sharp, 2010: 61).

A key element in this causation is the perspective of timeframe. Under brutal repression, simmering ripple effects take time to break through the surface to eventuation through an often slow, meandering process of fermentation or even metamorphosis and patience is called for. The recent positive developments in democratic reform in Burma came more than two decades after the 1988 massacre. The painful memory of the 1989 Beijing massacre was but just 23 years old. The brutal reign of the Soviet communists lasted just seven decades, compared to its predecessor, the three-century long Romanov dynasty. The rule of the CCP has just been over six decades, a speck in the millennia-long history of Chinese dynasties, mostly each lasting a few centuries.
3.2. Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Domination

The three factors of instrumental activities, bargaining power and ideology, according to Vaughan and Archer (1971), represent necessary (though might not be sufficient) conditions of success for assertive groups. On the other hand, facing these assertive groups is institutional domination whose success also depends upon the existence of three necessary conditions, namely monopoly, constraint and again, ideology. Juxtaposing Vaughan and Archer’s two constructs gives the composite schema as shown in Figure 2. Monopoly is used here in the Weberian sense of the word, referring to CCP’s monopoly of political power. The corresponding feature on the side of democracy movement or civil rights activism comprises instrumental activities defined as the sum of actions to devalue the political monopoly of the authoritarian ruling party on which domination is based.

However, for the dissidents, instrumental activities are not enough, whether for successful civil rights assertion or striving for political liberalization. Bargaining power, according to Vaughan and Archer, is as necessary as “an alternative to the use of violence and yet implies a degree of organization which would make revolt effective if reform were denied” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27). However, its two components of numerical strength and organization are crucial to its effective use and success – the two elements which both the democracy movement in exile and the *weiquan* activism are presently lacking. The fragmented democracy movement in exile has not been able to command any credible bargaining power in an environment of astounding economic power and international clout of CCP-ruled China as well as the collective amnesia on the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.

Figure 2 Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict

![Figure 2 Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict](image)

and Beijing massacre resulted from more than two decades of successful information wipe-out inside China for those born or educated after 1989, and nationalism and national pride that came with increasing national strength – sentiments that the CCP has been unabashedly relying on to justify its continued unchallengeable political monopoly as the “party that delivers”. On the other hand, the bargaining power of weiquan activists is also questionable even when they have been carefully restricting their demand for redressing civil grievances to single issues, justifying their actions by appealing to the written laws and constitution, and localizing the targets of the protests to avoid challenging the central CCP government whom they are protesting to rather than against. Such reservations reflect a common consciousness for self-preservation among civil rights activists, especially those who are less known internationally and hence could not expect international pressure to support them in the event of the State’s decision to destroy them.

This apparently represents a middle path between, on the one hand, the co-opted intellectuals and academics employed in universities and think tanks who have to speak in support of CCP’s one-party rule while talking about the prospects of democratization, many of whom probably in their most private moment of metareflexivity would see through the apparent contradiction in terms and the extent of “infidelity” which as defined by Thomas Paine, “does not consist in believing, or in disbelieving [... but] consists in professing to believe what one does not believe”25, and on the other hand, those high-profile weiquan activists who have built up an international following and hence could afford to be more honest and vocal in speaking their mind. However, even among the latter, the degree of activism and expression apparently depends much on personal circumstances and constraints. This is true among the exiled former student leaders of Tiananmen. This is also true among the more recently exiled weiquan activists. To level the accusation of “being bought over” against some of these high-profile personalities in exile is probably not only unfair but cruel and inconsiderate. What choice does one have if one’s parents or siblings’ families are still virtually being held hostage in one’s home province or village under threat of State’s persecution on account of one’s degree of activism and expression overseas? The real “ruminating self” that intervenes in between the field and the habitus (à la Bourdieu, 1990, 2008) whether through those soul-trying months of passion and anguish at that critical juncture in 1989 or in today’s harsh environment for pro-democracy and civil rights activism, which constitutes the intercessor that connects the structure’s causal powers to agency, may be fully understood only by the particular human agents themselves whose existential projects that they construct in foro interno upon which the actuation of social structures’ causal powers through constraints and enablements is contingent (Archer, 2003). It is in this context that human agents act to mediate their own
social conditionings as well as effectuate the reproduction or transformation of society in the context of their individual, particular environmental circumstances, while such “full mediatory mechanism has been held to depend upon human reflexivity; namely, our power to deliberate internally upon what to do in situations that were not of our making.” (ibid.: 342)

Most importantly, with the absence of both the elements of numerical strength (referring more to actively mobilized members of a movement than simply to sympathizers and moral supporters in general) and organizers – despite the emergence of Falungong as an exiled resistance group which has shown impressive solidarity, numerical strength, organizing skill as well as focused dedication to a cause that the wider democracy movement lacks – the NVA movements’ pressure on the Party-State as the dominant group still remains insignificant in terms of making the latter relinquish some of its position-related advantages, the success for which necessarily depends on the conjuncture of these two elements (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27). Nevertheless, even with these two constituting elements of bargaining power, successful assertion on the part of the NVA movements is still difficult to achieve as strong social control through the ruthless weiwen efforts (constraint) has so far served to forestall the possibility of concerted action, and economic success and mesmerizing projects showcasing astounding national strength and glory (ideology) to negate the desire for it, may it be that of the weiquan activism, Falungong resistance or the wider spectrum of democracy movement. Under this situation, the Party-State domination has continued to be stable, with the NVA movements being disadvantaged by both a low degree of internal solidarity and organization as well as numerical weakness to effectively engage in concerted action, vis-à-vis the same factors on the side of the State (ibid.: 27-28).

3.3. The Working of Assertion

Numerical strength mentioned above refers not only to members directly within the movements or directly active in the movement in some capacity, but also the “third parties” or members of the “the general public” that the movements would need to win over as “allies” or at least “friendly neutrals”, as shown in Figure 3.

Winning over uncommitted third parties is absolutely important for any chances of success in NVA assertion, in a process referred to by Irwin and Faison (1978) as a “political jujitsu” in which shifts of attitude are important as well as shifts of behaviour “because both sides adjust their actions according to how they gauge their support”. Above the “third parties” in Figure 3 are “opponents” who, from the perspective of the NVA proponents, represent potential converts especially among State-coopted
Figure 3 Process of NVA Assertion *vis-à-vis* Party-State

intellectuals, emerging middle class, disgruntled working class but also moderates and reformers in the ruling echelons and bureaucracy, and from the point of view of the Party-State, the dejected and demoralized leaders and members of NVA who feel lost outside the country’s economic success and who are at the edge of losing conviction in the movements that they feel are increasingly becoming irrelevant facing the continuously growing strength of the Party-State. Such tactics are crucial for if “the assertive group has limited members willing to engage in concerted action and a low degree of internal organisation, while the dominant group has a strong and highly organised portion of its membership engaged in applying constraints, domination is likely to prove stable” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 28). However, such variations in relative numerical and organizational strength on the two sides could only account for their relative degrees of success in this process of “political jujitsu”, as Vaughan and Archer caution, for a parameter inevitably influencing this power interplay that has to be taken into account is “the alliances either group can form in order to acquire wider support for either domination or assertion” (ibid.), i.e. not only the active and passive opponents but also the “neutrals”, the uncommitted third parties, to win over as portrayed in Figure 3. In striving to arouse doubts and conflicts among their opponents, for instance, agents of repression could induce cracks in activists’ solidarity and cause the activism to be stymied by appearing moderate and conciliatory to certain more “agreeable” factions in order that they would abandon their goals. Internal cracks are more prone to occur under a situation where the NVA movement is relatively weak in bargaining power as well as instrumental activities, as portrayed in Figure 4.

4. Strategic Action and Change Mechanisms

From a broader perspective, subtle or overt forms of suppression as illustrated above could come in different forms, but what Gene Sharp identified as four mechanisms of change produced by NVA in their opponents could similarly be mechanisms through which the Party-State, besides outright violent suppression, could break its opponents in the NVA movements, namely, conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp, 2010: 35-37). The reason that the Party-State may no longer opt to rule by just brute force like old-style dictators but choose to use more subtle forms of coercion beneath a coat of democratic trappings, including grassroots elections, modern free market, politically censored but otherwise free access to Internet and other social media and “evolving” rule of law, is simply that it has grown smarter with experience to realize that the old-style autocratic “thuggish repression” no longer works in this globalized Internet age, as William J. Dobson analyzes in his recent book *The Dictator’s Learning Curve*: 
Inside the Global Battle for Democracy (2012). Having evolved with the times into a much more public relations-savvy technocratic clique, operating by consensus at high levels while enhancing economic efficiency at the lower tiers of government, the modern Party-State thus presents a uniform face of a government that delivers to the citizens and the world to dissuade attempts to challenge or destabilize its political monopoly which is today, of course, no longer purely a matter of politics and governance, as the Party-State has grown into a complex nexus of politico-pecuniary interests, a gargantuan structure of interfedding power, favour and lucre with simply too much to lose.

Referring to Archerian realist social theory, the abovementioned relationship between NVA and the Party-State could be illustrated with a taxonomy of institutional configurations of second order emergent properties and the situational logics (see Table 2). According to Archer, when “there are necessary and internal linkages of a complementary nature between systemic structures, then institutions are mutually reinforcing, mutually invoke one another and work in terms of each other” in the form of necessary complementarities. On the other hand, a more complex situation occurs when “the constitution of the social system is marked by incompatibilities between institutions which are none the less internally and necessarily related […] to one another yet the effects of their operations are to threaten the endurance of the relationship
itself”, leading to the situational logic of compromise, because necessary incompatibilities mean that “the promotion of vested interests has to be a cautious balancing act, a weighting of gains against losses, where to accrue bonuses is also to invite or incur penalties” (Archer, 1995: 222-224), portrayed in Figure 4 as an inadvertent commensalistic symbiosis between NVA and the Party-State. However, such configuration, according to Archer, is inherently unstable because whereas “the respective corporate agents co-exist on uneasy compromises which serve to contain the incompatibility itself” in the form of a roughly symmetrical mutual dependency (the “commensalistic symbiosis”, largely inadvertent, in Figure 4), “if symmetry slips for any reason […] then the counter-balancing of gains and losses which constrained all parties to compromise gives way because gain now attaches to counter-actualisation” (ibid.: 224-225). This occurs in a situation that not even overt or tacit “forgiveness” and reluctant amnesia of the oppressed or tactical or genuine expression of reconciliation, promise of gradual political reform and atonement as those from Wen Jiabao could effectively restore the inherently unstable balance whose tensions have always only been temporarily held in check by such compromise. While both the configurations with necessary complementarities and necessary incompatibilities were internally morphostatic,

[...] the continued containment of incompatibility in the latter case clearly depended on no radical changes in the resource distribution which would have dispensed with the need to compromise in order to defend vested interests. On the contrary, change in available resources would have resulted in the pursuit of vested interests cracking through the system fault line represented by the incompatibility and realizing a different structural state of affairs.

(ibid.: 225)

In other words, whether in terms of the inadvertent commensalistic symbiosis portrayed in Figure 4 or Archer’s morphostasis or Reeler’s “cold stuckness” in Figure 1, the long uneasy coexistence between the democracy movement, largely seen as a moral persistence otherwise ineffective so far as a pressure
group, and the Party-State, is never inherently stable and potential changes
to this reluctant compromise of a status quo is always simmering under the
present façade of economic prosperity and social harmony which in the
meantime continue to hide from the dominant political power the urgent need
for change that in turn, ironically, when revealed could even provoke stronger
resistance to change. Similarly simmering is the so far illusive transformative
change since the 1989 massacre, biding its time before reaching a critical
point of bifurcation, in which the role of the individual as a catalyst for
change cannot be underestimated, even if the long-term impact of the action
or suffering of the individual, whether s/he be a Wei Jingsheng, a Li Wangyang, a Ni Yulan, or a Liu Xiaobo, is not
immediately explicit and the activist’s lone crusade does not at the moment
receive the due sympathy of the wider public.

4.1. Contingent Incompatibilities and the Situational Logics

In addition to the above two varieties of situational logics, Archer reminded
us of another possible generic effect “when contingent incompatibilities
does arise (whether from within or without the system in question) because
both sides become party to the situational logic of elimination, where the
greatest gains coincide with inflicting maximum injuries on the other side”
(Archer, 1995: 226). While one could argue that with the power imbalance as
portrayed in Figure 4, the results of such ultimate showdown would inevitably
be one-sided, firstly the configuration in Figure 4 does in no way deny this,
and secondly the results might not be so clear-cut given the well recognized
social contradictions of the country that with the strategic mobilization of
material and human resources (which are, for example, at best dormant on
the side of NVA) even if not leading to such implosion as Gordon Chang has
time and again predicted, could serve to contribute to the engendering of
new or accentuated form of social cleavages which are, as Archer believed,
“antithetic to (a) the stable reproduction of social relations fostered by, and
constitutive of, the necessary complementarity and, (b) the containment of
divergent interests promoted by and sustaining the balance of resources and
forces which serve to ‘preserve’ necessary institutional incompatibilities
despite their internal tensions)” (Archer, 1995: 226).

Lastly in the Archerian configuration is the case of contingent com-
patibilities which entails a “situational logic of pure opportunism” with
emerging new interests and new material means for their realization –
“an institutional re-patterning which is antithetic both to the protective
reproduction of the status quo and also to the repressive containment of
incompatibilities where the unavailability of alternative resources was what
previously bound the parties to mutual compromise” (ibid.: 227). This is so
in both the morphostatic configurations observed earlier, especially if stability is only enforced by an uneasy compromise while “significantly agents are constantly on the look out for [resources] in order to break out of stalemate and counter-actualize their interests” (ibid.: 226).

Ultimately whether morphostatic or morphogenetic in construction, any emerging confrontation between the dominant Party-State and the assertive (NVA) group would be dependent upon the balance of factors present on both sides, and Figure 4 is in fact showing a limiting situation of an unchallenged domination by the Party-State under which all the factors of assertion that exist in the NVA has so far been weak and suffering from disorganization. Of course the focus here so far has been on the wider democracy movement, largely in disarray in exile and ruthlessly crushed domestically, while other elements of NVA could well give a somewhat different picture.

4.2. Strategic Dimension of Chinese NVA

See, for example, Figure 5 which shows a matrix of Chinese NVA. On the horizontal axis is the strategic dimension, or the “tactical-strategic” dimension of Weber and Burrowes’s typology of NVA, which indicates “the depth of

Figure 5 Matrix of Chinese NVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fundamental</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student-led Tiananmen protests of 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiquan action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reformative</th>
<th>Transformative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falungong resistance movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial ethnic minority resistance movements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1989 democracy movement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Instrumental
analysis, the ultimate aim and the operational time-frame which activists use” (Weber and Burrowes, 1991). In the context of contemporary China, along this strategic spectrum could be found protesters in 1989’s student-led demonstrations and members of today’s Falungong resistance movement who represent the more “reformative” (or “tactical” in Weber and Burrowes’s terminology) exponents of NVA in terms of their assertive orientation, and who resort to short- to medium-term campaigns in pursuing a particular goal within an existing social framework, setting their eyes on reform, but not revolution. Protesters in 1989’s student-led demonstrations were not revolutionaries aiming to overthrow the CCP as in the interpretation of the hardliners in convincing Deng Xiaoping to order the bloody crackdown, but common people from all walks of life voicing their demands for rectifying mainly corruption-related social injustices, as understood by the conscientious Zhao Ziyang who objected to but failed to avert the violent suppression – an

Figure 6 China: Expanding Demand for Political Institutional Change, 1978-1989

By 1989 greatly expanded popular demand for a more liberal and just society had diverged so much from existing situation of accentuated corruption and social injustice as by-products of market-oriented economic reform unaccompanied by liberal democratic political reform and result of Deng Xiaoping’s intolerance for “bourgeois liberalization” – an intolerable gap has developed between what people wanted and what they got

Reform since 1978 had raised popular demand for a more liberal and just society – a tolerable gap remained between what people wanted and what they got

Source: Base on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution; see Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1).
unavoidable social development over the first decade of market reform that culminated in an intolerable gap between what the masses got (vis-à-vis the élite) and what they really wanted, as portrayed in Figure 6.

Also falling more towards the “reformative” wing along the spectrum is the Falungong resistance movement. While Jiang Zemin’s decision to ruthlessly crack down on Falungong and the extreme extent of his action have remained some sort of a mystery – explanations among observers have ranged from perceived ideological threat to a spillover of power struggle within the politburo to even Jiang’s personal jealousy of the influence and appeal of the movement’s founder, Li Hongzhi 李洪志 – it seems that despite the brutal total onslaught launched by the State upon Falungong followers, the action has largely backfired as the fervour of the movement’s resistance has been truly remarkable, something that is unprecedented in the Chinese democracy movement post-1989. Some observers have even described Falungong’s resistance to State suppression as “fanatic” but the term is apparently misleading as it has remained a peaceful physio-spiritual movement combining meditation and qigong 气功 exercise with a moral philosophy. Despite the relentless discrediting propaganda campaign launched by the State media centring on “superstitiousness” of the movement and painting its founder as a “fake guru”, such discrediting which may be effective against a personality cult does not seem to work well with a movement centred on traditional Chinese moral philosophy combined with meditation and qigong exercise, with deep root in traditional Chinese Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist world view. One may not need to agree with Li Hongzhi’s particular brand of qigong-based philosophy or with Li’s personal capacity or even his deservedness or worthiness to be the founder of such a movement which some would consider pseudo-religious for its wide appeal and the degree of devotion of its followers – and by the same token, one needs not agree with Karl Marx’s particular brand of socialism or the personal capacity of the myriad prophets. However, this is a far cry from concurring with the State’s brutal suppression of the movement and condoning the harassment, imprisonment and the psychological and physical torture meted out to the movement’s followers, sometimes to death such as in the suspicious case of Qin Yueming 秦月明 of Shandong. Ironically, such ruthless clampdown on a harmless movement has in a curious way strengthened the exiled democracy movement for the Falungong movement in exile – mainly US- and Canada-based – has added itself to the worldwide Chinese dissident community not only in terms of moral support but practical, material means unprecedented in the Chinese democracy movement. To challenge the State media, the Falungong movement in exile has set up highly effective international media organizations including The Epoch Times newspaper, New Tang Dynasty Television and Sound of Hope radio station, and in support of these, the
movement’s followers also went into establishing performing arts companies and producing software to circumvent State censorship in order to reach the Mainland Chinese audience. Such efforts have indeed introduced a much required vitality to the wider exiled democracy movement and these far-reaching English-Chinese bilingual media outlets (besides eight other languages in the case of the newspaper), run by well-educated Falungong practitioners overseas who are not known to hold back when it comes to devoting their time, money and technological expertise in fighting back against Chinese State suppression, have provided a channel for activists of the democracy movement to voice their criticisms of the CCP regime. In short, the brutal suppression of the Falungong movement since 1999 under the Jiang Zemin administration has unexpectedly given the wider exiled democracy movement a huge boost in voice and morale, and definitely represented a milestone in the development of the Chinese democracy movement. However, while the emergence of the Falungong movement, or rather its brutal suppression by the CCP regime, has ironically given the perpetually disorganized and squabbling exiled democracy movement an unexpected but such a much needed boost, in terms of Weber and Burrowes’s criteria of analytical depth, ultimate aim and operational time-frame the movement at present is still essentially more tactical than strategic – or more “reformative” rather than “transformative” as portrayed in Figure 5 – as a movement which was forced to fight back by continuing brutal State persecution. It aims basically to pressure the State to give up its persecution – i.e. to “rehabilitate” the peaceful physio-spiritual movement and recognize its right of existence in Chinese society. Its target of removal from power is not exactly the CCP monopoly but the faction that began and continued the persecution – in Falungong-speak, the xiezhaipai 血債派 i.e. “blood-debt” faction. Its contribution to the organizing strength of the wider democracy movement, while truly remarkable, is hence incidental.

On the other hand, upon the same spectrum, the post-1989 pro-democracy dissidents, whether domestically based or in exile, and probably to a lesser extent the rights-defending (weiquan) activists, whether single-issue or cross-issue advocates, fall in terms of their assertive orientation more towards the “transformative” (or “strategic” in Weber and Burrowes’s terminology) pole, as they are being guided more by a “structural analysis of social relationships”, with their main concern being about the fundamental transformation of society and hence their particular campaigns being conducted within the context of a long-term revolutionary strategy (Weber and Burrowes, 1991). The weiquan activists can be seen slightly less “transformative” than those in the democracy movement, for unlike the latter, the weiquan activists are often compelled to advocate a regime change towards multiparty liberal democracy simply as a result of the disillusionment with a Party-State which is too repressive and
unaccommodating. With a less repressive leadership which is more caring in responding to their demands, these *weiquan* activists or at least some of them would probably choose to retreat further from the “transformative” pole, and instead of pressing for multiparty liberal democracy, would accept extensive reform of the Party-State as an alternative.

“It is not an accident that Premier Wen Jiabao once called himself ‘grandpa Wen’ – *Wen yeye* [温爷爷] – in front of the people”, noted Hung (2011). In a sense, the role of Wen, long cultivated as the loving grand patriarch who is at every scene of disaster to offer moral care for his “children”, is orchestrated to be an on-site projection of the central Party-State as the modern successor of the caring benevolent emperor who was always there to *zuozhu* (do justice) for his downtrodden subjects and punish his abusive officials, in a system that survives till today in the form of *shangfang* (travelling to the capital for petitioning) by the abused people suffering in the hands of corrupt local officials. Such an image is crucial to the survival of the Party-State, as any self-seeking dynasty-builder has long been acquainted with, for the mandate of heaven would be lost if that image is shattered – ever since Mencius (Meng Zi 孟子) emphasized two thousand three hundred years ago the people’s satisfaction as an indicator of a ruler’s moral right to power, and justified the overthrow of an unworthy ruler. Just imagine if Wen Jiabao does have the power and leverage within the Party-State to translate his caring image into a force that would turn the Party-State into a less repressive, more benevolent political monopoly, giving due consideration to contemporary China’s tortured history as well as her potential for breaking up, it probably would not be too far-fetched to think that most of the *weiquan* activists whose advocacy is increasingly converging with the wider democracy movement might move further back from the “transformative” pole and be content with intra-Party-State institutional reform rather than revolutionary regime shift to multiparty electoral democracy. It is a fact that even under the present repressive atmosphere, most of the *weiquan* activists are careful to show that they are protesting *to* rather than *against* the central CCP government by limiting their demand for redressing civil grievances to single issues and localizing the targets of their protests, and justifying their actions by appealing to the written laws and constitution of the People’s Republic. Immediately after the escape from his two-year house arrest in Shandong, the blind civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚 brought a video clip to *Youtube* asking Premier Wen Jiabao to enforce justice (*zuozhu*) by punishing the Shandong officials, hence in a way endorsing the authority of the CCP central government. In a recent interview by the *Yangguang Shiwu* 阳光时务 magazine, Her Peirong 何培蓉 (“Pearl”/*Zhenzhu* 珍珠) reiterated that she was not a pro-democracy activist but just a simple person who felt the need to assist those other civil
rights activists who were being persecuted by the authorities ever since, as a volunteer helping the child survivors of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, she got to know about the injustice done to Tan Zuoren 谭作人 and Huang Qi 黄琦 because of their exposure of and investigation into the real death toll of students and the “tofu dregs” schoolhouse scandal. Despite her apparent contempt for the Shandong government that perpetuated the injustice towards Chen Guangcheng, Her Peirong said during the interview that she was more concerned with effectiveness of her action than unending rhetoric criticizing the government, for it is always important to leave “face” for the government, i.e. to be realistic in order to open space for positive interaction with the government in solving problems, and that she would rather believe in gradualism in building a democratic society. Such utterances of moderation of course also reflect the vulnerability of the civil rights activists, especially those who are less known internationally and hence more helpless in the face of State persecution and abuse, who desperately need to protect themselves against the recurring charge of “inciting subversion of State power” (煽动颠覆国家政权罪) that the State has been unfailingly using to put them away.

Relating to this, there has been a debate recently among the pro-democracy activists and June Fourth survivals over the conventional use of the term “pingfan 平反” (i.e. to rehabilitate or to redress a mishandled case) in the demand “to pingfan June Fourth”. The concern is understandable as the demand for the CCP regime “to pingfan June Fourth” is rightly, as argued by those opposing the use of the term, tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the CCP regime who is merely asked to rehabilitate the 1989 protests as a patriotic movement, to release those remained jailed for the protests and to apologize to and compensate those injured during the brutal crackdown or persecuted thereafter and families of those who were slain on the Chang’an Avenue and elsewhere in Beijing in June 1989, and to allow the long-exiled former protesters to return home. Hence, while no one doubts the political defiance shown by the exiled democracy movement, the continued use of the word “pingfan” could probably explain the internal dilemma concerning the determination and the ultimate aim of the movement and its leadership, as well as throw light upon the current disarray of the movement.

4.3. Strategic Dilemma of Territorial Ethnic Minority NVA

Such dilemma faced by the weiquan activists and the wider democracy movement takes on a somewhat different dimension in the case of the territorial ethnic minority resistance movements. While still largely being nonviolent in action against what is perceived as central State repression – ethnic frustration and alienation, as well as interethnic mistrust do sometimes lead to violence (e.g. in Xinjiang) or “negative violence” – here referring to
the Tibetans’ self-immolation as the ultimate protest by suicide (a poignant Chinese classical term referring to this being *sijian* 死諫).

Dissidents and dissident activities among China’s non-Han minority groups or in the ethnic regions no doubt represent a dimension of Chinese dissent which is often ignored in studies on Chinese dissidents. Indeed, they are usually seen in terms of China’s ethnic relations and ethnoregional problems, but as long as these dissidents are Chinese citizens challenging the dominant one-party State in their struggle for ethnic human rights, against the encroachment, whether economic, cultural or environmental, of the Han-dominated central State, and for other key issues related to ethnic autonomy and self-determination, their action is but just a dimension of China’s democracy and civil rights movement. It is true that secessionist, centrifugal forces are often at work in China’s dissent with an ethnoregional flavour, but much of such sentiment in many ways reflects a deep distrust of the central State, being fed by new grievances caused by perceived exploitation by the central State and the Han influx and the resultant interethnic inequalities and the destruction of the ethnic regions’ natural environment and traditional way of life by a pattern of economic development seen more as a tool for Han exploitation, as well as hurtful memories left by the Maoist horrors during the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” – the decade when China went crazy.

4.3.1. Legacy of Cultural Revolution’s atrocities

During the Cultural Revolution, the purge of Ulanhu (Ulaan Hūū) and the accompanying attack on the so-called “Ulanfu Anti-Party Treason Clique” (乌兰夫反党叛国集团), the ruthless witch-hunt to find members of the fabricated New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (新内蒙古人民革命党/新内人党), and the attack on the so-called “Inner Mongolia’s February Counter-Current” (内蒙古二月逆流) implicated 80 to 90 per cent of Mongolian cadres and many more ordinary herdsmen. Official figures revealed that of around 790,000 people persecuted, more than 27,900 people were beaten to death and more than 120,000 people were maimed. While the number included some Han cadres and others too, most victims were the Mongols, thus having inevitably sown the seeds for interethnic mistrust and animosity (Jin, Kang and Huang, 2006: 85-87). In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region next door, copies of Qur’an and Uyghur books were allegedly burned and imams paraded on the streets and humiliated. Religious life and devotees were persecuted, and 90 per cent of the more than 10,000 mosques were closed, deconsecrated, occupied or demolished (Jin, Qing, Bi and Kang, 2006: 186). The attack on minority religious life was also rampant in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region,
in the witch-hunt for the alleged “local ethnic nationalists”. The worst atrocity committed against the Hui Muslims during the Cultural Revolution, however, occurred outside Ningxia, in the town of Shadian in Yunnan Province’s Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, where the closure of the only three mosques in the town under the “Breaking Four Olds” campaign since 1967 and the continuing savage class struggle offensive that saw religion as counterrevolutionary finally led to the masses’ forced reopening of the mosques in October 1973 and severe confrontation and CCP’s brutal crackdown during seven days and eight nights from the dawn of 29th July to 4th August 1975 with PLA guns, cannons and even aerial bombardment that slaughtered more than 900 Hui Muslims, injured and maimed more than 600 and destroyed more than 4,400 residential houses and even the Ming-dynasty Grand Mosque of Shadian. While being blamed, as usual, on the “Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Anti-revolutionary Cliques” by the post-Cultural Revolution CCP, the order for the brutal crackdown had allegedly come from Deng Xiaoping who would live on to order a similar massacre in Beijing in June 1989. If inclusive of the neighbouring Hui Muslim villages like Xinzhai, Chebaini, Tianxin, Maolong, Songmaopo and Maoke which were also under the 10,000-strong PLA attack, the total number of Hui Muslims killed in the massacre exceeded 1,600 and those injured and maimed approached a thousand, with Xinzhai’s casualty even exceeding Shadian’s. Listing the Shadian massacre as one of the four incidents of atrocities committed by Deng Xiaoping, Zhu Changchao of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in a recent iconoclastic research article described the action of Deng as the military chief of staff in ordering the shooting and bombardment of Shadian and the neighbouring Muslim villages not only as a massacre but a crime against humanity. So were the other three incidents of atrocities committed by Deng – the expanded anti-rightist campaign of 1957 led by him that was responsible for the cruel persecution of 569,957 so-called “rightists” who were jailed, exiled, tortured or murdered (among whom 559,952 were later rehabilitated two decades later in 1980, thanks to the efforts of Hu Yaobang); his brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979 resulting in a casualty of about 100,000 (50,000 on either side, including a large number of casualty among the Vietnamese civilians), in support of China’s ally, the genocidal regime of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea (Cambodia), to “teach Vietnam a lesson” for the latter’s invasion of Kampuchea that overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime and effectively stopped a genocide which had by then already murdered 2 million Cambodian people including 20,000 ethnic Vietnamese and 400,000 ethnic Chinese in its four-year rule since 1975; and of course the June 1989 Beijing massacre whose notoriety needs no elaboration (Zhu, 2012).
In Tibet, the destruction of Tibetan culture during the Cultural Revolution has been devastating. Of the 6,000 monasteries, temples and shrines in Tibet, over 99 per cent were looted or destroyed by the Han and Tibetan Red Guards. Tibetan monasteries were destroyed with dynamite and artillery while hundreds of thousands of sacred Buddhist scriptures, rare books and paintings were recklessly burned or even used as shoe soles or wrapping paper. The destruction of the Tibetans’ traditional culture and religion is total, extending into every village and family as all cultural and religious instruments were to be destroyed, and brutal denunciation campaigns had involved all forms of torture and beating resulting in deaths, maiming, insanity and suicides. What lay behind the brutal attack on Tibetan culture is a policy of full assimilation to Han culture and the destruction of a Tibetan identity different from that of the Chinese, as the countless temple ruins around Tibet today bear witness to the horrors of the extremely violent implementation of the “Break Four Olds” campaign during those insane years of the 1960s (Tsering, 2011: 394-398).

It is a fact that for nationalities in these ethnic minority regions today, at least at a higher level Cultural Revolution is still widely seen as a purely Han matter, a result of the power struggle among the Han élite, and in the case of Tibet, as Professor Tsering Shakya highlighted in his 1999 detailed study, no Tibetan had adequate clout and status to consider engaging in internal power struggle with the Han cadres. While Tibetans were also involved in various forms of violence and partisan politics, their participation are seen by today’s Tibetans as under duress from the Chinese authorities to choose sides and to engage in the brutal class struggle campaigns, within an undeniable environment of continued Han enmity and attack on Tibetan culture and identity, as reflected in the continued official connivance towards the brutal and violent denunciation sessions against the locals labeled “black five types” (ibid.: 421).

Hence, while it is absolutely misleading to see the Cultural Revolution excesses purely as a part of the Han-dominated central State’s repression of minority regions and it is true that fractional rivalry within the non-Han ethnoregional communities whether local cadres or Red Guards did share the culpability in these regional disasters whose sources are more ideological than ethnic, this would exonerate the present CCP neither from the sins of the fathers nor from the continuing disastrous mass in its regional policies wherein lies its incapability to achieve national reconciliation beyond a fake harmony enforced by brutal repression, being constrained by its cardinal principle of perpetuating the one-party rule that places it at loggerheads with the concepts of unreservedly facing its past crimes and bringing itself to justice in a court of political choice and free and fair elections, separation of powers, and ethnic self-determination.
4.3.2. Realities of current ethnoterritorial unrests: the case of the Tibetans

As the clearest manifestation of the Tibetan despair, the cases of Tibetan public self-immolation since 2009 have recently totaled 51 (which resulted in 41 deaths over the past three years, according to the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala, India) after an 18-year-old monk and a 17-year-old former monk burnt themselves to death in Sichuan Province’s Ngawa阿坝自治州 (“autonomous prefecture”) on 27th August 2012.36 The number rose to 70 after a 19-year-old burnt himself to death in a village of the Hezuo合作 city in Gansu Province’s Gannan甘南 Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture on 10th November 2012, being the seventh Tibetan who committed self-immolation since 7th November, concurrent with the holding of the 18th National Congress of the CCP.37 There is reportedly another self-immolation immediately after the closing of 18th National Congress of the CCP – this time by a Tibetan woman on 17th November in Qinghai Province’s Tongren同仁 county which resulted in her death.38 Arguing against the standard official explanation of the source of the Tibetan unrests almost solely in terms of the influence of the alleged exiled “Tibetan independent movement” – the so-called “Dalai Lama clique” – and Western conspiracy, and Western media’s focus on the suppression of human rights and cultural genocide, the now-proscribed civil rights legal advocacy group, the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI) (Gongmeng Falü Yanjiu Zhongxin 公盟法律研究中心), published a report of its field survey of the Hezuo city and Xiahe county (合作市、夏河县) in the Gannan Autonomous Prefecture of the Anduo Tibetan region (安多藏区甘南自治州), and the Lhasa city and Naidong county (拉萨市、乃东县) in the Weizang region (卫藏地区). The areas surveyed are respectively the important places of origin of the Tibetan arts and culture and ancient centre of Tibetan political culture, today both facing accelerated modernization and transformation, subject to huge external influence not least as the frontier of Tibetan-Han interaction.

A legal research centre set up in 2003 which has been involved in various sensitive cases in recent years – including the case of the blind civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng, the melamine-contaminated baby milk scandal, the case of Hubei girl Deng Yujiao邓玉娇 who killed an official who was trying to rape her, and various other civil rights and press freedom cases – and published critical reports on China’s human rights and minority policies, the OCI/Gongmeng公盟 was closed down by the government on 17th July 2009 ostensibly for tax offenses, subsequent to the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang riots and with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic approaching, immediately following the revoking of the licenses of 53 Beijing lawyers, many of whom being well-known personalities active in civil rights cases.39 Just like the suppression of OCI, this “Survey
Report on the Social and Economic Causes of the 14th March Incident of the Tibetan Region” (藏区3.14事件社会、经济成因调查报告) was also swiftly banned by the government. Focusing on the Tibetan region’s social polarization, economic alienation and ethnic marginalization especially in facing the influx of the economically much more successful non-Tibetan ethnic migrants, the long report provides a Chinese, yet non-official, explanation of the 2008 unrests. China’s economic reform has forced upon the Tibetan people, according to the report, a new value of development and consumerism based upon Deng Xiaoping’s dictum “Development is the hard principle” (Fazhan caishi yingdaoli 发展才是硬道理), wherein the Tibetan people are told to displace their “backward” traditional culture with the new mantra of GDPism that together with overall economic, infrastructural and technological advancement, also brings about local officials’ corruption, destruction of local way of life and communal cohesion, as well as pollution and other manners of environmental degradation. The report points out that large scale investment and support by the central government for regional development have hardly benefited the Tibetan masses who have been thrown into a limbo where traditional values and way of life are being eroded rapidly by the advent of materialistic modernization which at the same time is bringing little noticeable benefit to them. On the other hand, money pumped in by the State is of little help to the independent development of or injecting vitality into the local Tibetan economy and bringing larger benefits to the Tibetan masses, in view of the lack of core industries of advantage, given the fact that agriculture and livestock husbandry are still being stuck in an elementary stage, and that the main driving force of the commodity economy is ironically non-Tibetan. In terms of governance, even the localization of bureaucracy accompanying the development of ethnic “autonomous region” over many decades has ironically brought more problems than tangible benefits, according to the banned OCI report.

Unlike other provinces, an ethnic “autonomous region” like the Tibetans’ suffers in terms of public service from the lack of wide cross-province mobility in appointment. In her comments on Gillian Hart’s clever abbreviations of CC, MM, and SS – “Confucian culture” as emphasized by anthropologists, “magic of the market” by economists, and “strong State” by political scientists – for explaining the Asian booms, Lynn White highlighted specifically the role of the local power networks in these almost miraculous economic tours de force (White, 2009: 11). Nevertheless, local entrenched élite power network, which has inevitably resulted in the lack of mobility mentioned above in the Tibetan region, is in fact prevalent in many parts of the country, not necessarily being a result of inadequate supervision as attributed to in the OCI report, but often derived from intricate power bargaining linked to the centre. Whichever the reason, such power network has always
been a good breeding ground for corruption, power abuse, rent seeking and low efficiency. Restoration of the religious institution in the Tibetan region after the end of the Cultural Revolution, ironically, has brought about power entanglement between government officials, new economic élite and the religious establishment, leading to a new power framework with the formation of “new aristocrats” (xingui 新贵, here mainly referring to the newly appointed high officials and their cliques), thus adding to the difficulties for institutional reform to break down the class-based group interest barrier in order to bring about a fairer resource distribution. Compared to the “traditional aristocrats” (chuantong guizu 传统贵族, here mainly referring to the feudal cleric and landlord classes), these “new aristocratic” strata are much stronger, given their more complex social resources and legitimacy. However, while the legitimacy of the traditional aristocratic class were internally generated through clan and tribal approval and politico-religious arrangement, the “new aristocratic” strata have their power derived externally from their approval by the Chinese central State, and hence at times of severe social contradictions are less able to act as an authority recognized by the Tibetan masses or as a buffer during State-masses confrontation. In addition, these “new aristocratic” strata’s loyalty to the central government also does not appear to be any much stronger than the traditional aristocratic class. While the old aristocratic class’s first preference was to strive for a political balance between the interests of the local masses and the central State, the alienation of the “new aristocratic” class from the local masses, whether from the tribal or religious perspective, has to some extent led to the local people considering them as “outsiders” and holding the central government as being liable for the results of any of their improper actions or misdeeds.

Due to the peculiar characteristic of the Tibetan region as an ethnic minority frontier territory, weiwen (“maintaining stability”) has an added significance as a policy imperative and represents an absolutely overriding task prevailing over “development” though “development and stability” has been the officially stated guideline of governance for the country’s ethnic minority regions. While much power has been delegated to the local ethnic Tibetan officials to stabilize the region, the lack of effective supervision, according to the OCI report, has led to these officials using “maintaining stability” as an excuse for their failure in governance and pretext for suppressing social grievances, by blaming everything on “foreign forces” and the Tibetan independence movement. The report cites a case where a county government in the region even simply defined a dispute with the farmers and herdsmen over compensation involved in the building of a hydroelectric power station as an “anti-splittism” and weiwen issue. “Shouting ‘anti-splittism’ and blaming everything on ‘overseas hostile forces’ has become a tool for the local officials to strengthen their status and interests and to secure
more power and resources”, the report cites Phüntso Wangye, founder of the Tibetan Communist Party.

Thus, it can be seen that like weiquan activism, territorial ethnic minority resistance movements are being pushed into an uncompromising position by outdated, repressive State policy which has further fueled ethnic resentment which was originally engendered by socioeconomic inequality and public corruption. The fact of the absolute demographic dominance of the Han Chinese dwarfing the minorities out of a critical mass, coupled with a reductionist Marxist legacy of perceiving ethnic problem as class problem, is apparently clouding the CCP regime from effective understanding of China’s ethnic problem, including that in the volatile ethnic regions of Xinjiang and Tibet (Yeoh, 2010b: 609). As a result, continued repressive handling of regional grievances is leaving ethnic territorial groups no choice but to embrace a universal struggle for democracy in the hope that a regime change at the centre could lead to more territorial compromise, accommodation and real ethnic autonomy and even a genuine federalism or a confederation, and for the moderates, in the hope that such more amicable solutions would forestall secessionist calls from their hard-line compatriots which are gaining an expanding audience thanks to the continued iron-wrist manner of the present central State’s ethnoterritorial policy.

4.4. Ideological Dimension of Chinese NVA

And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.

– Friedrich Nietzsche (1886), Beyond Good and Evil

Shown on the vertical axis of Figure 5 is the ideological dimension of NVA, or the “pragmatic-ideological” dimension of Weber and Burrowes’s typology, which indicates “the nature of the commitment to nonviolence and the approach to conflict” utilized by activists, including “the importance attached to the relationship between means and ends and the attitude towards the opponent” (Weber and Burrowes, 1991). Today’s mainly exiled democracy movement and the Falungong resistance movement fall on the “instrumental”, or “pragmatic” in Weber and Burrowes’s terminology, side of the spectrum in their mission to defeat the Party-State whose relentless and uncompromising persecution of them has left them with no choice but view the conflict between themselves and their common antagonist as one stemmed from and continued to be fueled by incompatible and irreconcilable interests. This position is in stark contrast to the 1989 (pre-massacre) Tiananmen protesters and today’s weiquan activists who, in a sense, view the Party-State as a partner in their struggle to bring about social justice for the masses. Instead of aiming at nothing short of dismantling the political monopoly of the Party, an
end they perceive as impractical and might even be harming their cause, they are more willing to work with the Party – or what they perceive as the more conscientious and moderate faction of the Party – to eventually bring about meaningful reform of the Party-State as a partner and a means to promote social justice. They, as portrayed in Figure 5, hence fall on the “fundamental” wing of the spectrum, to be exponents who, as Weber and Burrowes described, “choose nonviolent action for ethical reasons and believe in the unity of means and ends” and more fundamentally, “may view nonviolence as a way of life” rather merely as an instrument of political struggle – be that a manifestation of some personal belief or faith, or an acceptance of a second-best solution after carefully weighing the costs and benefits of, or of the struggle for, more drastic structural transformations.

Again, the territorial ethnic minority resistance movements would hover about the origin, reflecting the peculiarity of such NVA which is affected by a particular territorial ethnic minority’s relationship with the Han-dominated central State.

Related to Figure 5, a three-dimensional typology of political actions in terms of degree of targeted change, degree of institutionalization/routinization and degree of organization of the Party-State and the NVA, including the ethnoterritorial movements, is shown in Figure 7.

4.5. Typological Properties of Ethnoterritorial NVA

The characteristic fluidity and complexity of ethnoterritorial NVA assertion can be seen in Table 3 which shows van Amersfoort’s (1978) typology of “majority-minority” relations via a combination of the orientations of dispersed and concentrated subordinate groups with three dimensions of dominant group aspirations. Using the terms “dominant” (or “superordinate”) and “subordinate” that convey more accurately the power dimension, instead of van Amersfoort’s “majority” and “minority” which can be semantically confusing when size and power do not coincide, Table 3 illustrates the complex relationship between different ethnoterritorial groups and the central State, and a number of probable outcomes produced by this configuration.

Ethnic consciousness and ethnic intensity, which are associated with the controversial homeland/immigrant dichotomy and territorial policies in countries with considerable degree of sectionalism, play a crucial role in determining public policy in a multiethnic society. From this perspective, the goals of the dominant and subordinate groups are of particularly great importance. Van Amersfoort summarized the objectives of the dominant community into three major categories that he termed “emancipation”, “continuation” and “elimination”. Emancipation policies aim to ensure full citizenship rights for the subordinate without insisting on their cultural or
Figure 7 Chinese NVA and the Party-State: Typology of Political Actions

Source: Based on Zhao (2008: 767), Figure 26-1.

Table 3 Van Amersfoort’s Typology of Dominant-Subordinate Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation of Dominant Group</th>
<th>Dispersed Subordinate Group’s Orientation</th>
<th>Concentrated Subordinate Group’s Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>Particularistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation</td>
<td>emancipation process</td>
<td>sectarian minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuation</td>
<td>suppression (struggle for emancipation)</td>
<td>reservation situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination</td>
<td>forced assimilation or extermination</td>
<td>forced assimilation or extermination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
structural assimilation. Such policies do not require subordinate communities to disappear as a distinct entity. To a large extent such are the policies pursued in, for instance, post-Franco Spain (a radical transformation from the elimination policies, examined below, of the repressive years of Generalísimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, the *Caudillo*) and Belgium (close but not completely satisfactory policy description due to the lack of a clearly subordinate community).

Continuation policies seek to preserve the existing relationship between the dominant and the subordinate. The reason may be that the subordinate group performs certain functions for the dominant or is being exploited by the latter. However, the goal of continuation can also arise from passive rather than active policies – “a refusal to pursue a policy of active emancipation for a minority that has become part of the society in the course of historical development” (van Amersfoort’s, 1978: 230). Certain minorities – e.g. the Roma (Gypsy) community, called the “Gitanos” in Spain – may prefer to be left alone to pursue a symbiotic, though unequal, relationship with the dominant society.

Elimination policies can be pursued in two ways. The dominant society may undertake measures aimed at the forced assimilation of the subordinate group by suppressing its constituent elements such as language, religion or culture, e.g. the suppression of the Chinese language in Indonesia under the Soeharto regime, Iran’s persecution of the Baha’is and Turkey’s repressive policy against Kurdish language and culture. It may also attempt the physical extermination of the subordinate group, e.g. the expulsion of Asians from Uganda by the Idi Amin regime, population transfer during the partition of India, the genocide against Chinese in the history of Indonesia and the Philippines, and the “ethnic cleansing” occurred in the successor states of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. While the Falungong followers might perceive the Chinese Party-State’s relentless persecution of their community as belonging to this category, the context of the crackdown which began during the Jiang Zemin administration on the nascent, fast-spreading physio-spiritual semi-religious movement is admittedly political rather than cultural. So is the persecution of recusancy in the form of the underground Catholic and other Christian churches (“house churches” independent of the official/”patriotic” churches) in the country.

On the other hand, while the dominant groups vary in their attitudes towards the subordinate communities, the latter may aim to achieve different relationships with the rest of the society. Wirth (1945) suggests a framework that allows for a fourfold response to subordinate (or “minority”) status: pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist and militant. Aiming to live side by side with, though not to be a part of, the dominant group, a pluralistic subordinate group seeks the dominant society’s toleration for its differences. It achieves its goal when “it has succeeded in wresting from the dominant
group the fullest measure of equality in all things economic and political and the right to be left alone in all things cultural” (Wirth, 1945: 357). While the pluralistic subordinate group is content with the dominant group’s toleration and aims at no more than cultural autonomy, its assimilationist counterpart aspires to be integrated unidentifiably into the dominant group. Working towards complete acceptance by the latter, this minority aims to merge eventually with the larger society. On the other hand, a secessionist (or separatist) community seeks to achieve political as well as cultural independence from the dominant group, by repudiating assimilation and scorning mere toleration or cultural autonomy. Lastly, a militant community attempts to assert its dominance over others, which may include the existing dominant group. In a description that befits the Serbian minority’s conquest of Bosnia before the tide of war turned in late 1995 (in contrast to the four-year Serbian secessionism in Croatian Vojna Krajina)\(^4\), Wirth depicts the ambitions of a militant minority:

> Far from suffering from feelings of inferiority, it is convinced of its own superiority and inspired by the lust for conquest. While the initial claims of minority movements are generally modest, like all accessions of power, they feed upon their own success and often culminate in delusions of grandeur. (Wirth, 1945: 363)

In terms of orientation, van Amersfoort defines universalistic subordinates as those who aim at participation in society and demand equality and, in general, also the preservation of alternative roles. They thus correspond to Wirth’s “pluralistic”, and to a less extent, “assimilationist minorities”. In the case of concentrated subordinates, universalism can take on the form of regionalism. While also aspiring to improve their position, particularistic subordinates “do not demand ‘equal’ rights with the [dominants], but derive their rights from their own particularistic value system” (van Amersfoort, 1978: 230). They thus correspond to Wirth’s “secessionist” and “militant minorities”. Table 3 demonstrates that a stable relationship between the dominants and subordinates free of conflict is an exception rather than a rule, since only two out of a total of twelve cells formed by the interface of dominant-subordinate orientations – those marked “emancipation process” and “federalism” – suggest the prospect of a stable form of participation in society by subordinate groups. Federalism, as a “process and institutional framework for territorial management of power and resources […] appropriate for those communities that occupy geographically delineated areas and are both willing and able to preserve and exercise self-government within these areas” (Duchacek, 1988: 16), is thus far from a prevalent phenomenon in the world context.

Intergroup relations in the case of China indeed do not fit nicely into van Amersfoort’s typology. In contrast with the treatment of exotic minorities\(^5\),
the Chinese central government’s dealings with the “real” minorities – the Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols and the highly Sinicized Manchus and Hui – seem to be close to a version of passive continuation. On the part of the minorities such as the Tibetans, the Uyghurs and increasingly the Mongols, their orientation has so far seemed largely to be pluralistic and universalistic, but inflexible State policy could be carrying a risk of pushing them towards particularism, as illustrated in Table 3, through further alienation, and towards the “fundamental” and “transformative” pole in the dimensions portrayed in Figure 5, thus exacerbating the already simmering secessionistic tendencies, and hence, in line with the typology set out in Table 3, making it immensely more difficult to reach a viable future amicable, federal or confederal solution.


With the carrot-and-stick approach to maintain its survival, the once-brutal-dictatorship-turned-benevolent-dictablanda (à la O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) has managed to preserve the status quo of its own rule as well as the interests of the “other power-holders” by both selling the credit it claimed on behalf the industrious, enterprising and persevering masses whose newly freed entrepreneurial spirit, long-recognized in the communities of their brethren worldwide, resulted from the Party’s repudiation of the Maoist policies, has doubtlessly led to the country’s economic success during the economic reform decades since 1979, as well as extracting the support of these “other power-holders” who are willing to abdicate their opportunity to rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the ensuing strong State run by the present regime (Stepan, 1985), in a faute de mieux deal much akin to Karl Marx’s description of the Bonapartist regime in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852). Marx’s classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the State and the dominant group, which in the case of contemporary China, the ruling CCP regime and the dominant social élite and groups whose inability to overcome the present State’s monopoly of violence to force a regime change has given the Party-State the opportunity to use the leverage gained both to preserve the status quo and to propound its claim as the protector of stability and prosperity in exchange for the acceptance of its legitimacy, for even when “a government’s use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government’s other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence” (Tilly, 1985: 172), though it could turn out to be a Faustian bargain that these social élite and interest groups might live to rue. In the stylized representation in Yeoh (2010a: 254, Figure 8), proscription
of even the slightest manifestation of dissent against the one-party rule has managed to contain societal political action to the routine intra-party politics at the far bottom right-hand corner, despite the sporadic outbursts of people power usually stemming from localized grievances which have always been quickly suppressed. Amidst all this, individual political actors are playing a central role in giving existence to the obduracy of the system, for the causal powers of systems and structures cannot exist without the mediation through the human agency, as Archer (2003) admits despite her rejection of the theorem of the duality of agency and structure.

Hence, while State making gives existence to durable instruments of surveillance and control within a country, the establishment of the State apparatus, together with the process of war making and resource extraction, also necessitates the forming of alliances by State managers with specific social classes, whose members contribute resources and technical services, as well as assist to ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, “all in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies” (Tilly, 1985: 181, 183) who of course include the massive labouring classes always need to be suppressed and subdued – which in turn seems to respond to the question posed by Lynn White at the beginning of her book Political Booms: Why are all the main parties in the East Asian countries she studied including China’s ex- but still nominally communist party so business-oriented and relatively uninterested in workers? (White, 2009: 3) On the other hand, it is indeed a basic characteristic of such a racketeer government – one that perpetuate its power through violence – that brutality is part and parcel of its drive to maintain stability, at all costs. Take the case of the high-profile case of Chen Guangcheng – not that brutality is particularly evident here but just for the fact that it is well reported.

4.6.1. Chen Guangcheng’s dramatic escape and its implication for weiwén

In the night of 22nd April 2012, blind civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng scaled the wall of his village residence where he and his family had been placed under strict house arrest since September 2010 after having served his jail term of four years and three months, ostensibly for the destruction of public property and traffic disruption, after his revelation of the brutal implementation of population control policy by the government of the prefecture-level city of Linyi 临沂 in Shandong Province, involving women’s forced abortion and sterilization, and made a dash for freedom. According to Chen’s fellow weiquan activist Her Peirong who is better known by the name “Zhenzhu” (i.e. “Pearl”, from her twitter name “Pearl Her”) and Beijing scholar Guo Yushan 郭玉闪 who both played a key role in Chen’s escape, despite being a blind man, Chen miraculously scaled eight walls, crossed over...
ten field ridges, slept in pig sties and crop fields, and fell hundreds of times over the almost 20-hour trail, depending only on hearing and with a broken leg, and finally exited the village after crossing a stream, virtually crawling his way out over the last stretch of his escape route, full of injuries. Thereafter, he escaped from Shandong in a car driven by Her Peirong, met up with a team of dissidents in Beijing led by Guo Yushan, and ended up seeking protection in the American Embassy.  

Other than the drama of the incredible escape, which allegedly even involved a car chase in the streets of Beijing, and the breathtaking bravery of all those who helped him escape, including Her Peirong, Guo Yushan and other weiquan activists and some of Chen’s fellow villagers and even allegedly some conscience-stricken guards enforcing his house arrest, the case of Chen Guangcheng has again brought into focus various critical issues related to current situation of dissent in authoritarian China.

During his inhuman house arrest in Linyi, Shandong, weiquan activists who were coming to visit him to render help were repeatedly beaten up by local thugs who were guarding his house. At least a hundred local thugs were paid to enforce a watertight round-the-clock surveillance of his residence – a structure that Chen himself in a dry humour referred to as the “Chen Guangcheng Economic Zone”, though probably some local villagers were under duress and threat to themselves and their families to be paid to guard Chen. To get Chen to leave the American embassy, his wife was reportedly tied on a chair for two days and threatened to be beaten to death. Activists and friends who were trying to visit Chen at the Beijing hospital where Chen was after he left the American embassy were beaten up too. Well-known weiquan lawyer Jiang Tianyong was brutally beaten to deaf in his left ear by the guobao (national security officers). Others who came to the hospital to support Chen, such as artist Liu Yi and weiquan activist Wang Lihong, were also beaten up or detained.

On 14th June 2012, shortly after the mysterious “suicide” of Li Wangyang, a petitioner named Yu Rufa from Hebei Province, apparently trying to take a cue from Chen Guangcheng, attempted to enter Beijing’s US embassy but was taken away by the police. Again mysteriously, he died on 16th June after having been transferred to the Hebei officers to be taken back to his home province. Is that a dire warning to those who were trying to follow in Chen’s footsteps?

The case of Chen Guangcheng has served to show that squandering economic resources on “maintaining stability” (weiwen) which is fast becoming a bottomless pit of endemic corruption instead of on solving the root causes of such instability is engendering an ironic phenomenon of weiwen feeding into the instability itself by resorting to more and more repression on expressions of protest and hence creating more and more acute grievances.
However, any attempt to break out of such dilemma would put the regime in a Catch-22 situation as the effort would entail a paradigm shift involving the abrogation of the present self-imposed legitimacy of the authoritarian one-party rule and moving towards a human rights-respecting liberal democratic system of multiparty electoral institution that recognizes not only civil liberties of the people but also their freedom of political choice.

4.6.2. Regime legitimacy and the dilemma of hexie

On the issue of the CCP regime’s legitimacy, while not denying that much progress is required before China turns democratic, Bo (2010) argues against the accusation that the CCP’s rule is illegitimate. According to him, CCP faces no crisis of legitimacy because to assess the legitimacy of a political regime, one needs “to see whether such a regime is receptive to the governed”, and it is “wrong to evaluate the legitimacy of the CCP rule by relying solely on ‘expert’ opinions of the Western academia and media because they are in no position to judge whether the CCP has right to rule or not” (Bo, 2010: 117).

By the same token, CCP has been adamantly arguing that the Western notion of human rights should not be made applicable to China which has a completely different set of national conditions (guoqing butong 国情不同). Such argument could be seen as for the convenience of legitimizing the continued authoritarian rule of the one-party regime that ruthlessly proscribes freedom of speech and freedom of political choice, but there could also be an ideological basis for it. Causes of social changes can usually be categorized into three groups, viz. the economic, the political and the cultural factors. Economic factors, especially the impacts of industrial capitalism, form the core of the Marxist approach to social changes. Such Marxist emphasis on economic factors, whether for ideological reasons or for the convenience of power maintenance, still forms the basis of the CCP’s fundamental definition of human rights as the people’s rights to be fed, to be sheltered, to be educated and to be employed. It is upon this ideological foundation that regime-coopted intellectuals could be so confidently singing praises for the Party’s definition of human rights (with Chinese characteristics) while providing academic support for the Party’s rule. For instance, Professor Xu Xianming 徐显明, president of the China University of Political Science and Law (中国政法大学) posited in 2005 the hexiequan (和谐权, i.e. “harmony rights”, apparently in line with the official “construction of a harmonious society” policy of the CCP) which according him is to “supersede the earlier three generations of human rights (i.e. rights of freedom, rights of survival and rights of development)”52. The proposal of this so-called “rights of harmony” is apparently closely linked to the introduction of the “index of Chinese revival” which according to Yang Yiyong 杨宜勇, director of the
Institute of Social Development at the Macroeconomic Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展和改革委员会宏观经济研究院社会发展研究所), in a paper presented in August 2012, had reached 0.6274 by year 2010, i.e. 62.74 per cent had been achieved in Chinese national revival which was defined as consisting of five components – further strengthening of mainly economic composite national strength; realizing comprehensive social advancement; enhancing perfection of socialist democracy; harmonious development between human and nature; and accomplishing the motherland’s unification. An impressive achievement indeed, given that the revival index was just 0.4644 five years earlier in 2005, says Yang, according to his computation. Without getting engaged in a futile debate over the spuriousness of such novel concepts and indices (the latest in a series that also included the xiaokang 小康/moderately well-off index and the xingfu 幸福/happiness or well-being index) that doubtlessly reflect a concerted attempt by co-opted intellectuals to lend academic credence to the feel-good factors promoted by the Party-State (sparing-no-cost, as can be seen in the US$40 billion spending on hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics – the most expensive Olympics extravaganza in history, even after taking inflation into consideration – see Table 4), hand-in-hand with the media suppression on reporting of “negative news” – all in all part and parcel of the overriding weiwen policy imperative.

As Weidong Zhang comments in his critical discourse analysis of the People’s Daily editorials and commentaries: “The self-congratulatory accounts of the Beijing Olympic success, in the light of China’s rise and its return to the glory, speak aloud to a domestic audience, function not only to hail the domestic audience into a subject position of proud Chinese to cheer for the party-state, but also to promote national solidarity with this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>40 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>15-16 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>14.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>9.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>3.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montréal</td>
<td>1.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.546 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rekindled national pride of the rise of China.” (Zhang, 2012: 18-19) Such “subject position of proud Chinese to cheer for the Party-State” however definitely is not limited to the domestic audience but also leaders and respected intelligentsia in the overseas Chinese communities – a generation whose outlook has been shaped by their personal first-hand experience of China’s humiliation at the hands of the Western powers and Japan up to the Second World War, and to whom the bainian guochi 百年国耻 (hundred years of national humiliation) is still crying out loud for redemption. Hence they also constitute a generation of business leaders and intelligentsia among whom Beijing’s stance that the benefits of stability under one-party rule far outweigh the risky endeavour of democratization and decentralization and that the human rights of the 1.3 billion-strong populace to be free from starvation and to be sheltered far outweigh the Western notion of freedom of speech and freedom of political choice would find resonance, and a generation to whom a China that could stand tall among the community of nations, a China that is fast becoming a superpower, and a world that stoops to a rising economic, military and “Cultural China” (Wenhua Zhongguo 文化中国) are all that count in bestowing pride on one’s Chinese ethnicity, whilst probably little else matters. Nevertheless, how far the Party-State could continue to exploit this antediluvian cycle of what William A. Callahan (2010) termed “pessoptimism” of national humiliation and national glory to rally the people – both Chinese citizens and Chinese Overseas – around the five-star red flag and garner support for the legitimacy of CCP’s enforced political monopoly and suppression of political dissent in the name of hexie (harmony), especially among the Internet-savvy post-90 generation who are further removed from the memory of the “hundred years of national humiliation” seems to be increasingly doubtful.

In November 2010, a few months before the arrest of Ai Weiwei 艾未未 on 3rd April 2011, a “Sumptuous River Crab Feast” (hexie shengyan 河蟹盛宴) was called by the renowned dissident artist through an Internet appeal as a satirical protest against the government’s imminent demolition of his Shanghai studio, in an ongoing mockery of the State’s political rhetoric of building a héxié 和谐 (i.e. “harmonious” – the Party-State’s euphemism for censorship and muzzling of dissent) society by Chinese netizens’ witty punning with a slight tonal change into héxiè 河蟹 (river crab). Ai was immediately placed under house arrest at his Beijing residence but the “feast of 10,000 river crabs” went on as planned on 7th November 2010, attended by 400 to over a thousand people under the surveillance of numerous plainclothes policemen, with some participants yelling “I want to tear up and gobble up this sideways rampaging, tyrannizing, sinister river crab (hexie)!”. To Ai Weiwei, who is not short of practical experiences of being brutalized by the State apparatus for his involvement in civil rights struggles, the severe
censorship, euphemized as *hexie* (harmony) to muzzle unofficial perspectives, has served the State to hide the inefficiency and inhumanity in society and politics, while the government is allowing its cronies to accumulate huge, indecent wealth at the expense of education, environment, natural resource and public interest of the masses. Ai sees such a society composed of cheap labour and tight control by the public security apparatus, sans creativity, as unsustainable, especially with the advent of the age of the Internet which he perceives as an effective technology to terminate authoritarian regimes – witness the role IT played in the jasmine revolutions – and the best gift heaven has ever bestowed upon China.61

While admirers of the Chinese economic miracle62 has unreservedly credited the post-1989 CCP with bringing back China’s long-lost glory and even seen the economic achievement as justification for the 1989 crackdown, such views could be naïve and greatly misguided. As Bao Tong 鲍彤 ruminates in his introduction to Zhao Ziyang’s posthumously published memoir:

> There are people who said that the crackdown has led to prosperity. What I know is: economic reform created prosperity. It is the people who have, with market economy, crushed the yoke of Mao Zedong to create prosperity. Now there are people who concluded that prosperity is the output of crackdown. Facing the global economic crisis, I do not know whether they are preparing to introduce the experience of crackdown to save the world economy. There are people who applaud that a muzzled China – a China in Total Silence – has leapt forward to become the world’s second largest economic entity – just after the United States; I believe this is true. Under the brutal rule of Kublai Khan, China has so early already been the prosperous paradise witnessed by Marco Polo […] June Fourth opened up a new phase of Total Silence. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, the China in Total Silence reiterated economic reform and wealth redistribution. But who are the beneficiaries of such redistribution in a China in Total Silence?63

This brings us back to the issue of the regime’s legitimacy which relies so much on CCP’s seemingly proven ability to deliver on the economic front and China’s astounding new national strength for which the Party has been given so much or even sole credit. Contrary to the “receptive to the governed” argument referred to above64, legitimacy according to Arthur Stinchcombe depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed for the “person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 150, italics in the original)65 the probability of whose confirmation of the decisions of a given authority constitutes the latter’s legitimacy. These other authorities, says Tilly (1985), “are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also
desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule [which] underscores the importance of the authority’s monopoly of force” (Tilly, 1985: 171-172). Lynn White in her four-country study of money-power nexus observed that: “By no means are state agents the only powerholders with whom business owners (as well as regional gangsters and mob-affiliated political canvassers) make liaisons. They also link up with each other. The coherent state, even if it behaves as a single actor, is just one of the interlocutors for other networks in either a fair or coercive ‘civil’ polity.” (White, 2009: 37) In a wider context, it is in this way that these “other power-holders”, be they societal pressure groups, professionals, or academics and the intelligentsia, “have been co-opted into the decision-making process, rewarded with perks and privileges, and are no longer available as a source of inspiration [for the dissident activists …]”, having retreated “from ‘politically engaged and intellectually oppositional topics’ to inquiries reconcilable with the prevailing order and designed to legitimate the hegemonic order” (Benton, 2010: 321-322). The “hegemonic order” here refers to that of a regime claiming credit for the economic successes that brought along heightened international stature and diplomatic prowess and propounding existing stability as the key to continued economic prosperity which itself actually being the unfailing characteristic of the Chinese and Chinese diaspora worldwide – an achievement which could have been brought to fruition naturally by the people once the Maoist yoke, both in the forms of the suppression of free entrepreneurial spirit and the political horrors, was lifted by the same regime that had foisted that yoke upon the Chinese people for three decades since 1949. Anyhow, according Tilly, a tendency to monopolize the means of violence “makes a government’s claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to resist” (Tilly, 1985: 172).

Hence, while many authors inside and outside China have been lauding the country’s “grassroots democratization” and intra-Party reforms as pointing to a promising path of de-authoritarian evolvement, the perception that China is moving out from the “politically closed authoritarian” category of regime type could prove to be as misleadingly whimsical as it is empirical unfounded. Furthermore, past record of mismanagement and repressive, often violent, response to dissent, including the excesses during the Cultural Revolution both in China proper and in the ethnic regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, and the June Fourth atrocities, may not be encouraging for many.

Postponing critical decisions on the last leg of reform – that in the political sphere – could only be postponing the inevitable and in fact accentuating the existing social contradictions, for both the speed and volatility brought about by the country’s breakneck economic transformation under increasing morphogenesis are making whatever State-sanctioned system
with the bottom line of one-party rule short-lived in viability when all State-guided *modi vivendi* as such could be at best *pro tem*. This inevitably brings the present train of analysis down to the level of agency.

The inability to face up to the rapidly changing reality and shifting social context and keep their meta-reflexivity (Archer, 1995) constantly on call to realistically assess their existing *modus vivendi* and to be receptive to a transformative change has trapped the ruling élite, for political survival, in the unwavering upholding of a prolonged stage of morphostasis, being the agency and most powerful institution that is best positioned to block or promote the path of morphogenesis, which according to Archer (1995), like morphostasis, is both generated and only exerting causal powers by working through social agents. Distinctively, Archer’s critical realism grants causal powers to the human agency that are indeducible from or irreducible to the causal powers of society (Archer, 2000). Such endowment of causal powers must be crucial for the Bourdievian human agents who, involuntarily occupying social positions that define their life-chances, upon gaining cognizance of their class members’ common interests, are being transformed into Tourainean corporate agents who now set out as social actors to transform society, personalizing the latter as per their ultimate concerns (Bourdieu, 1974; Touraine, 1969, 1973, 1978). It is in this context that, according to Archer, the existing system itself would shape the life-world practices geared towards reproducing, reshaping or transmuting the system, whose result, not really incompatible with Deng’s “river-crossing” dictum or Mao’s “perpetual revolution”, is poised to be contested and modified in the subsequent phase of the series of endless morphogenetic cycles of sociopolitical and sociocultural interaction and systemic conditioning and elaboration.

### 5. Weiquan Activism and Democracy Movement: Convergence and Divergence

Archer’s double morphogenesis sees both structure and agency as cojoint products of interaction in which agency is both shaped by and reshapes structure (Archer, 1995; 1996; 2000; 2003). Operating structures and purposely acting human agencies (combinations of acting individuals) in combination form the praxis and interface of social interaction that effects social change, wherein agencies are both creating and being limited by the structures, exemplified no doubt in the present context by the voicing of dissent and the corresponding crackdowns justified by the notion of “stability above all else”. However, social control, as ironically seen by Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), could be the broadest basis of social conflicts. In a sense, such coercion to extract conformity is normal, as all social systems exhibit association of roles and statuses that embody power relationships which tend
to be institutionalized as authority, sometimes self-perpetuated, with normative rights to dominate.

On the macrosociological level, while conflict is an inevitable part of social life and not necessarily negative as it is the engine for social change from both Marxian and Weberian perspectives, the key question is ultimately who gains at whose expense – the very question of equity – and this leads to the actions of the *weiquan* (rights-defending) activists. Indeed, from the interpretive perspective, social reality is ultimately a construction by people – in the present context be they the ruling political élite or the increasingly persecuted civil rights lawyers and activists, many of whom being the survivors of the 1989 Beijing massacre – and through interactions among them patterns and standards of behaviour would emerge. Nevertheless, unlike the democracy movement organizers like Liu Xiaobo and Xie Changfa who are also persecuted, these civil rights activists tend to seek instead “to protect and improve the rights of citizens within China’s constitutional constraints and legal framework with minimal political requests” yet not totally apolitical (Hung, 2010: 333-334).

As can be seen in Figure 5, while the current *weiquan* activism shares much with the wider democracy movement in terms of assertion for social justice and necessary political defiance, the two diverge when it comes to both practical strategy and fundamental ideological outlook and such differences would inevitably engender deviations in the nature of commitment to NVA and approach to conflict with the opponent.

Such unity and differences are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. The Falun-gong resistance movement and territorial ethnic minority resistance movements are not shown as separate columns but they are not excluded from the basic dichotomy shown in the two tables, for their shared properties (both in terms

| Table 5  Chinese Democracy Movement and *Weiquan* Activism: The Strategic Dimension |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Criterion**   | Democracy Movement | *Weiquan* Action |
| **Analysis of Social Framework** | Transformative, revolutionist | Reformative, involutional |
| **Aim**         | Relatively structural; focusing on a structural analysis of overall sociopolitical relationships | Revolution (planned change of system) |
| **Operational Timeframe** | Long Term | Short/Medium Term |

Source: Based on framework from Weber and Burrowes (1991); Vinthagen (2010).
Table 6  Chinese Democracy Movement and *Weiquan* Activism: The Ideological Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Democracy Movement</th>
<th>Weiquan Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Commitment</td>
<td>Instrumental, practical</td>
<td>Fundamental, ideational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Despite lack of progress, still committed to NVA as the most plausible and effective means to effect change</td>
<td>Despite State persecution under the pretext of <em>weiwen</em>, still committed to NVA as ethically best in fighting for social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means and Ends</td>
<td>Relentless persecution by the Party-State and frustration over lack of progress of a moderate approach could be leading to belief that means and ends are separable, precipitating radicalism, e.g. justification of “lies against lies” in media combat, especially in territorial ethnic minority resistance movements which could more easily foster a “we vs. they” mentality</td>
<td>Believing in the unity and indivisibility of means and ends, because the end can never justify the means “for the simple and obvious reason that the means employed determine the nature of the ends produced” (Huxley, 1938: 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Conflict with the Party-State</td>
<td>Incompatible interests; aiming at terminating one-party political monopoly and replacing it with multi-party free and fair electoral system; rejecting the compromise solution of a <em>dictablanda</em> or a benevolent ruler within the Party-State</td>
<td>Shared interests, at least with the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction within the Party-State; looking more for synergy of action together with “enlightened” members of the central Party-State against local corruption and abuse of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Opponent (Party-State)</td>
<td>Disillusioned with the traditional idea of waiting for an “enlightened ruler” (<em>mingjun</em> 明君) within the system (imperial court in the old days; the one-party State today), hence in a competitive relationship with ruling Party-State to destroy the Party’s political monopoly</td>
<td>Seeking cooperation at least with the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction within the Party-State to <em>zuo zhu</em> (enforce justice) for the people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on framework from Weber and Burrowes (1991); Vinthagen (2010).
of ideology and strategy) with the wider democracy movement and the *weiquan* activism – as have been illustrated in Figure 5 – and divergences can be seen as particular cases within the construction shown in the two tables. For instance, related to the issue of “means and ends”, it would be interesting to see how the coming leadership changes in CCP (reflecting its factional struggles) after its 18th National Congress as well as possible factional changes in the governments in exile (post-Dalai Lama scenario for the Tibetan government in exile, developments in World Uyghur Congress and Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance) will affect the State’s approach in terms of suppression or accommodation and minorities’ response in terms of moderation or radicalism in their continued struggle for ethnic self-determination whether in the form of autonomy or secessionism (see Table 3 for the intertwining influences of central State/dominant group’s and minority/subordinate group’s orientations on central State’s response to peripheral nationalism’s demands and the corresponding ethnoterritorial responses from the frontier regions).

5.1. **Resiliency of Weiquan Activism and Dilemmas of Central State’s Weiwen Imperative**

Clamping down on civil rights activists and whistle blowers like Cheng Guangcheng, Hu Jia 胡佳 and Ai Weiwei on the basis of *weiwen* could be initiated directly from the central government if the voicing of grievances were to be seen by the latter as potentially risky and possible to trigger a wider movement especially in view of the recent trend of coalescence of single-issue activisms – a phenomenon that brings to mind how the 1989 Tiananmen protests that started off as students’ protests circled around campus dormitory conditions, jobs and corruption, triggered by the death of the respected former president Hu Yaobang, soon escalated into a wider movement joined by intellectuals, reporters and others from all walks of life, which finally and inevitably spiraled into general pro-democracy demonstrations that threatened the political monopoly of the CCP. Or it could be, sometimes according to voices from the centre, a result of over-zealous implementation on the part of the local leaders and cadres. Guangdong’s deputy party secretary cum *Zhengfawei* 政法委 (Political and Legal Committee of the CCP) secretary Zhu Mingguo 朱明国, who was sent to set up a working group to deal with the Wukan 乌坎 crisis – who then went on to agree to the protesting Wukan villagers’ three demands on the government (i) to return village land, (ii) to return Xue Jinbo 薛锦波’s body and release the other villagers still in police custody, and (iii) to recognize the temporary committee of village representatives as legal – has commented on what he criticized as “lopsided interpretation of ‘stability above all else’” on the part of some local government leaders and cadres, which has led to inappropriate
responses to “mass incidents” as the misguided logic of equating “being safe and sound” as “being without incident”, according to him, has resulted not in rights-oriented but power-oriented weiwren, not active but passive weiwren, and not harmonious but coercive weiwren. (“一些地方和领导干部片面理解‘稳定压倒一切’，认为平安就是‘不出事’… 这种逻辑下的维稳，不是权利维稳，而是权力维稳; 不是动态维稳，而是静态维稳; 不是和谐维稳，而是强制维稳。”)73

Such weiwren deviations, as highlighted by Zhu Mingguo, can also be seen in the details and handling of many other high-profile cases. For instance, in the dramatic escape of Chen Guangcheng from his house arrest in Shandong due to his exposure of the inhumanity in the local government’s enforcement of one-child policy that involved cruel forced sterilization and late-term abortion, among the group of dissidents who played a key role was Her Peirong (“Pearl Her”), the Nanjing school teacher who fought for the rights of parents who lost their children during the 2009 Sichuan earthquake and who were harassed and persecuted when they pressured the government to probe into the suspected “tofu dregs” school-house scandal that led to the collapse of large number of school buildings during the earthquake. Also among these dissidents were the well-known environmentalist and HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia, who is also the director of the June Fourth Heritage and Culture Association and recipient of several awards from various European bodies including the European Parliament’s Human Rights Prize in December 2008 after he was sentenced in April that year to three years and six months in prison on the charge of “inciting subversion of State power”, and scholar Guo Yushan of the proscribed Open Constitution Initiative (OCI/Gongmeng).

It is a fact that such largely single-issue civil rights activisms are struggling to work within China’s current written legal framework (that at least is in existence on paper) and in most cases what they are challenging are the corrupt or extra-judicial practices, abuses of power and other excesses of the local – provincial, county, prefecture, municipal or village – governments, authorities or officials rather than the legitimacy of the CCP-monopoly of the central State, and they are hence in a way, even just in a tactical way, endorsing the legitimacy of CCP’s right to rule. However, to consider such single-issue civil rights activisms as posing little threat to CCP’s enforced political monopoly is to underestimate their potential threat to the CCP central State by ignoring their intrinsic concertedness with the wider democracy movement in terms of the common struggle for humans rights, though the relative emphasis on either political rights or civil liberties could differ in some ways from one to another mainly due to environmental differences and as a response to constraints on the ground. Such constraints, as shown in Figure 2, largely come more directly from the local governments, authorities or officials, and the degree of brutality and excesses differs from locality.
to locality, depending variously on local political atmosphere, the relative power of hardliners\textsuperscript{74} \textit{vis-à-vis} the more liberal, or at least less hard-line, factions\textsuperscript{75} projected through the appointments of local party secretaries and other officials, the degree of discretion of the local governments and officials derived much from a complex web of tier-to-tier linkages all the way up to the centre through a whole range of illicit but prevalent arrangements of bribery and lobbying, and the choice of the central government to continue turning a blind eye towards the excesses of the local governments and officials which it tacitly endorses as its hatchet men to protect central power and whose brutality is in many ways a direct result of the pressure from the centre to \textit{weiwen}, or alternatively the tactical decision of the centre to tolerate a more liberal, benevolent approach at the local level in a particular case at a particular time. A good example is a comparison between the local government’s treatment of Chen Guangcheng in Shandong and the Wukan incident in Guangdong.

The extent of the abuse of power and blatant disregard for the judicial system is atrocious in the case of civil rights lawyer and activist Chen Guangcheng. While the abominable action taken towards Chen Guangcheng, a activist fighting for the civil rights of the downtrodden and underprivileged but not a democracy advocate who challenges CCP’s rule, whether his jailing or his subsequent house arrest, can easily be blamed on the wayward local government and public officials who understandably see him as a troublemaker, the role of tiers of governments and officials above them could be intriguing. What Chen has revealed – the inhuman practices of forced sterilization and late-term abortion – are indeed a result of the central State’s strict implementation of its one-child policy. The gruesomeness of such actions was recently widely publicized in the case of a 23-year-old Shaanxi Province woman Feng Jianmei 冯建梅.\textsuperscript{76} The case of Feng’s forced late-term abortion attracted attention from all over the world after the photograph of a despondent Feng and her murdered seven-month-old foetus lying on a bed was posted on the Internet, after which Feng was virtually placed under house arrest at the hospital and her husband was allegedly beaten up and put under constant surveillance while a gang of people holding banners gathered noisily outside the hospital blocking her from returning home and condemning her and her family as “shameful traitors of the nation”, apparently referring to her talking to the foreign media about the issue.\textsuperscript{77} Feng’s case, despite the wide publicity, might actually yet not be the worst, for there was allegedly another recent case of forced late-term abortion involving a woman in Xianyou 仙游 county of Fujian province who was already into her eighth month of pregnancy when she was dragged into a hospital and have her baby murdered.\textsuperscript{78} According to Bob Fu 傅希秋, founder and president of the China Aid Association (对华援助协会), in his testimony at a hearing of the
US House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights on 9th July 2012, tragedies like that happened to Feng Jianmei and her baby amounted to hundreds or thousands every single day in China.\footnote{79}

5.2. Political Boom, State Violence and Weiwen

While such higher-profile cases of late-term forced abortion could eventually be played down with compensation from the authorities, the inhuman State coercion involved in implementing the one-child policy – the exposure of which has led to the persecution of Chen Guangcheng and many other civil rights activists – has always been part and parcel of the overall civil rights abuses perpetrated by the Party-State on its citizenry who has been denied political choice and judicial independence, over the decades marked otherwise by impressive market reforms and economic miracles. Turning a blind eye towards and tacitly condoning or even endorsing whatever atrocious and extra-judicial local action in silencing a trouble-making civil rights activist thus fit well into the central State’s top priority of weiwen (maintaining stability) which together with GDPism constitute the key to CCP’s continued political monopoly.

Such a phenomenon has been observed by Lynn White when referring “political booms” in her four-country study on local money and power, where she notes that: “Violence has been common in these political booms, along with money. Development has occurred only when national or local leaders who could benefit from it were sufficiently strong to effect it.” (White, 2009: 6-7) White defined a “boom” as a “quick economic or political change that is welcomed by most citizens” and posited that “both the origins and results of quick economic growth or stasis depend on specifically political incentives among the most effective social elites” \((ibid.: 1)\). Based on her four-country findings covering the People’s Republic of China (PRC, more specifically mainland China’s eastern regions of southern Jiangsu and Zhejiang province), Thailand, Taiwan (province of Republic of China/ROC) and the Philippines, White argues that both the origins and results of booms are more political, and less narrowly economic, than usually thought to be, and interestingly, while monetary capital is a factor for growth, “violence and threats of physical coercion often substitute for the local effects of money” \((ibid.: 2-3)\). Such violence, as commonplace as in CCP’s long history of bloody purges and political campaigns, has again manifested itself today in the post-idealist web of contradictions made up of money and power, as vividly revealed in an October 2007 telegraph of Shanghai’s American consulate dispatched to Washington released by WikiLeaks recently. The contents of the telegraph, according to WikiLeaks, include a failed attempt to assassinate Hu Haifeng
胡海峰，胡锦涛之子，2006年，杀害吴官正之子吴官正，据称成功谋杀，2007年1月，中央纪委秘书长陈良宇被调查，这可能与陈良宇同时期的腐败案有关。80 WikiLeaks的揭露也可能助长了对胡锦涛生命的三个传闻——2006年5月在黄海（黄海）黄海中，一艘军舰用两艘导弹发射器袭击载有胡锦涛的导弹艇；2007年10月，胡锦涛出席上海夏季奥运会开幕式时，一艘军舰的袭击失败；2009年4月，胡锦涛参观青岛（青岛）海上阅兵式时，一艘导弹艇的袭击失败。81

另一方面，官场内以私利为功能，互相庇护、相互包庇，以破坏被视为对其私利构成威胁的势力，正在侵蚀着一个官场腐败、滥用职权的社会。这与中央的派系斗争——“左派”“右派”“强硬派”“相对自由派”以及“政敌团队”千丝万缕，比如“太子党”“团派”等。同时，中国成功的分权化（导致市场培育或保存的“事实上的联邦制”或“帮手”与“掠夺”之手，正如俄罗斯的一些情况），并不意味着实行竞争性的多党制民主联邦制，因为中央仍然是单党一党制，正如Duchacek所指出的那样，联邦制是与单党制、法西斯式的单党制不兼容的：如果一个单党制将部分中央权力委派给地方，而在地方仍然实行一党制统治，这将导致一个单一的中央主义体系，或者最好的情况是一个地方统治权的联盟——一种联邦制度的特殊形式，但不是联邦民主。

联邦制不适用于具有民族主义和军阀统治的国家。如果一个单党制将中央权力的一部分委派给地方，而在地方仍然实行一党制统治，这将导致一个单一的中央主义体系，或者最好的情况是一个地方统治权的联盟——一种联邦制度的特殊形式，但不是联邦民主。

(Duchacek, 1988: 16-17)
Constraint on opposition consists not only of jailing of pro-democracy and weiquan activists but also of surveillance (often round-the-clock) of activists and other forms of weiwren efforts. For instance, to enforce Cheng Guangcheng and his family’s long strict house arrest after his release from jail, hundreds of village cadres, militias, police and “others” were employed at the going rate of at least 100 yuan a day, according to Chen after his escape\textsuperscript{85}, which can help to explain the dedication of these guards to their job which involved brutally beating up Chen and his family members as well as his friends and lawyers and local and foreign reporters who dared to try to visit him. This annual amount of probably close to a hundred million yuan of weiwren funding earmarked for guarding Chen (which he mockingly called the “Chen Guangcheng Economic Zone”) had formed an important source of income for the local officials and others involved. For the whole country, such weiwren allocation amounted to 7.017 hundred billion yuan in 2012 (which the government defined as “public security” expenditures), as compared to 6.703 hundred billion yuan for national defense.\textsuperscript{86} Professor Sun Liping 孙立平 of Tsinghua University’s Faculty of Social Sciences in a recent report\textsuperscript{87} comments on the sharp increase in the very high weiwren expenditure which in some places has reached a spare-no-expense, regardless-of-cost proportion. Part of these expenses actually do not make economic sense, according to Yu Jianrong 于建嵘, director of the Center for the Study of Social Issues at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as, e.g., ten thousand yuan spent on blocking a shangfang petitioner could have been better spent on helping to solve the petitioner’s problems. The root of the issue is of course that the cause of the shangfang lies more often then not in corrupt State-business collusion whose tentacles go deep into the core of the racketeer State, while the shangfang-weiquan activism is seen as a destabilizing element threatening the rule of the one-party State. Such worries on the part of the Party-State are not unfounded, for a normally tolerable gap that exists between the tolerant threshold of and actual social injustice due to effective “protection” function of a racketeer government could grow into uncontrollable proportions if left unchecked, as illustrated in Figure 8. Such great emphasis on weiwren and containment of the threat from the dissidents as reflected in the rocketing weiwren cost seen above can be observed in the tremendous expansion of the power of the Zhengfawei (Political and Legal Committee of the CCP) since the June 1989 Beijing massacre. The Central Political and Legal Committee of the CCP in its present form which was set up in 1980 was abolished in 1988 under Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s effort of political reform that suggested the separation of Party and Government but was reinstalled after the massacre and the purge of Zhao Ziyang. The dropping of Zhengfawei secretary from CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee when the latter’s membership was reverted from nine to seven with the conclusion of the 18th
Figure 8 Social Injustice under a Racketeer Government and Fundamental Change

Source: Based on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution. See Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1).

National Congress of the CCP on 15th November 2012 thus has to be one of the most significant institutional changes amidst the leadership transition that has otherwise shown little surprises given the overall “conservative” make-up of new standing committee.88

The reason for the unparalleled quest for economic achievement, of reckless GDPism at the expense of equity, and the spare-no-expense cultivation of a glorious national image from the 0.9 billion-yuan 2008 Olympic opening gala to the space programme within a national environment of widespread poverty, widening inequality and increasingly acute social injustice as a result of such runaway development can be and in fact needs to be seen in the same light.89 In an article later deleted from Gongshiwang,90 Chinese scholar Cai Shenkun 蔡慎坤 questions whether a yearly spending of hundreds of billions of yuan on a million-strong Chinese police force (or probably above ten million if inclusive of local non-police or para-police public security teams) within an environment devoid of judicial independence is leading to out-of-
control, self-justified *weiwen*-induced corruption. Defining a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction, Tilly (1985), by such standard, considers governments’ provision of protection as qualifying as racketeering:

To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.

(Tilly, 1985: 171)

Whether evoking the “hundred years of national humiliation” at the hands of the Western capitalist and Japanese militarist imperialists and her neighbour’s threat to her self-declared sovereignty over the whole of South China Sea on the external front, or branding all who challenge the self-perceived legitimacy of the Party’s continued monopoly of political power and through organized action aim to replace it with a multiparty “Western” electoral democracy, as legally guilty of “inciting subversion of State power”, the Chinese racketeer State run by the CCP has never hesitated to mobilize its formidable monopoly of violence to ensure the survival of its own rule, which is today probably nothing more than a terrifying embodiment of a “web of […] cliques, factions, and internal knots of organized crime” in the words Garnaut (2012) uses to describe today’s corruption-racked People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With the June Fourth massacre, which brought a tragic end to the hundred days of demonstrations in 1989 which began as student-led anti-corruption protests, leaving behind a vacuum of ideology, purpose and integrity “which money has rushed to fill”91, corruption has become “the glue that keeps the whole system together, after the age of idealism” in a secretive gargantuan system where “gangs” and clusters of patronage and bribery are congealing together by favours and corruption (*ibid*).

According to economic historian Federic Lane, it is the business of governments to sell protection, regardless of whether people would want this protection. Seeing from the economic perspective, Lane’s argument for State’s monopoly of violence is based on the fact that the very activity of producing and controlling violence enjoys large economies of scale, hence is in favour of a monopoly (competition would in general raise costs) (Lane, 1950, 1958)92, which in turn gives rise to a “tribute” (i.e. monopoly profit) that is otherwise called “extortion” in Ames and Rapp’s adaptation which sees analogy of such government action with predation, coercion, piracy, banditry and racketeering (Ames and Rapp, 1977).93
In a critique of Lane, Tilly (1985: 181) breaks organized violence perpetrated by agents of states down into four different activities: war making (“eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force”), State making (“eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories”), protection (“eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients”), and extraction (“acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection”), all of which being dependent upon the State’s tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. “From the perspectives of those who dominate the state,” posits Tilly, “each of them – if carried on effectively – generally reinforces the others.” Upon successfully eliminating its internal rivals – in the context of the bloody history of the CCP, the “anti-revolutionaries”, opponents of the one-party State and other dissidents – the State greatly strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war or simply to flex its military muscles in the regional or global arena, and to protect its chief supporters, who were the landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen in European history (ibid.) and in our present context consist of cadres and apparatchiks, and even “princelings” and Party-linked businessmen who are central to the interest and survival of the Party-State, as well as the co-opted intellectuals serving to uphold the image of legitimacy of the regime.

6. NVA Convergence and Divergence: The Role of Agency

Significantly, what were mentioned above are in a way corresponding to Margaret Archer’s three modes of reflexivity which in turn each expresses a particular orientation towards personal-societal relations (Archer, 2003: 351). Without attempting to stretch these Archerian concepts too far, the co-opted intellectuals could be seen as corresponding much to Archer’s “communicative reflexives”, the weiquan activists to “autonomous reflexives”, and the, mostly exiled, pro-democracy activists to “meta-reflexives”. The making of these three modes of reflexivity lies in the nexus between contexts and concerns, neither of which are static. While the “projects they forge in their initial social context, which was not of their making or choosing, may be experimental (and thus corrigible) […] some find sufficient personal satisfaction there to prolong the experiment into a life-project, thus endorsing their original and involuntary social positioning [… whereas for others] their involuntary contexts of social placement may simultaneously be shifting and changing at the micro-level, in ways which represent discontinuities for the subject” (ibid.: 344, italics in the original). In other words, these three modes of reflexivity have in fact emerged from three distinctive types of interplay between structural properties (social context in which the subjects find themselves involuntarily) and
personal properties (their concerns), to neither of which alone the resulting form of subjectivity are reducible since those who share the same type of initial and involuntary context might not develop the same mode of reflexivity and “contextual discontinuity” apparently does contribute to their making (ibid.: 348). For the co-opted intellectuals who have no choice but to survive and to work in supporting and as part of the authoritarian system and have in a way become the Archerian “communicative reflexives” as they develop concerns complementary to their continuous contexts and actively contribute to the replication of their social placement that thus ceases to be largely involuntary, which tends to contribute in turn to prolonging morphostasis even if unintentionally. On the other hand, the weiquan activists working day-to-day for their cause in the country in a way exemplify the “autonomous reflexives” who would not be able to accept such contribution to morphostasis due to the incompatibility of their developing concerns with the discontinuous contexts they encounter in society – an incompatibility that serves to foster autonomous deliberations and monitor their quest for a suitable social context to realize their concerns. While the weiquan activists are thus working in their own way to achieve change towards their ideal of social justice but in recognition of the political structural constraints within which they have to accommodate themselves, a head-on collision with which they would perceive as futile and counterproductive given the power asymmetry and State monopoly of violence, the pro-democracy activists, mainly and necessarily exiled, would find such accommodation with authoritarianism intolerable. These pro-democracy activists (and arguably some weiquan activists too to some extent) are in a way the Archerian “metareflexives”, being driven by the force of their sociopolitical ideals and cultural concerns – for some, shaped by their personal encounter and tragedy at the hands of a ruthless regime, and for others, by the day-to-day grotesque injustices perpetrated by the actions of a racketeer State – and an almost religious devotion to the embodiment, pursuance and actualization of such ideals and concerns.

While Archer’s theorizing has sometimes been criticized as focusing too much on internal conversation, conceptualized as a causal power that transforms both human agents and society, at the expense of intersubjective communication which is crucial for understanding the morphogenesis of structure through collective action and social movements – as she emphasized in the opening line of the first chapter of her 2003 treatise that “[w]here we humans not reflexive beings there could be no such thing as society” (Archer, 2003: 19) – it could be unfair not to take into consideration the relevance of her theorizing to the latter and the great potential of extracting a theory of collective action from her work. Her “metareflexives” for instance, while – true to her assertion that private life is an essential prerequisite for social life – being idealists seeking self-knowledge and practicing self-critique for
self-realization, are also driven by their personal missions to criticize their environment. They, in a way, represent Habermasian Meadian \textit{wertrationale} social utopians constantly judging themselves and their societies in a critical manner from the point of view of the “generalized other” and the alternate “rational society” (Habermas, 1987, 1992; Mead, 1934), thus showing concern for social injustice and refusing morphostasis or “cold stuckness” (Reeler, 2007) in the name of some cultural or political ideal or the preference for stability. Mead’s “generalized other”, after all, is the “organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self” (Mead, 1934: 154), enabling the human agent to raise questions of justice and rights. In this respect, while attributing the quality of the Archerialian “metareflexives” to the pro-democracy activists and that of the “autonomous reflexives” to the single-issue, single-case \textit{weiquan} activists, it needs to be noted that the \textit{weiquan} activists inevitably also exhibit some fundamental characteristics of the “metareflexives”. Similarly, in the complex, dense net made up of the social constitution of their \textit{modus vivendi} and the existential projects they construct \textit{in foro interno}, neither the pro-democracy nor \textit{weiquan} activists nor even the co-opted intellectuals could escape from autonomous reflexivity, wherein the internal conversation “is not an area where instrumental rationality has hegemony; it is just as much an arena for reviewing the emotional commentaries on [their] concerns, which are registered internally as [they] contemplate doing this rather than that”, which, as in this harsh winter of Chinese dissent, leads to their being “fractured reflexives” who are unable to conclude upon an ultimate course of action, or conversely sooner or later to a “review of themselves in relation to their circumstances to a plan for action” (Archer, 2007: 285).

According to Margaret Archer, each mode of reflexivity “is a distinctive way of deliberating about oneself in relation to one’s society. It is the modality through which the active agent continues to align her personal concerns with her social context.” (Archer, 2003: 349) The method of alignment varies, though, directly with the mode of reflexivity being exercised, adds Archer, while conclusions are being reached on the prioritized concerns which are in turn crystallized into determined projects, and certain orientation has been arrived at towards the reflexives’ encounters with constraints and enablements. These two deliberative outcomes in turn combine to represent the acquisition of a “stance” towards the sociopolitical context, and the acquired “stances” are “so different that the three distinct modes of reflexivity effectively conjoined subjectivity to objectivity in three completely different ways”, which means that “the internal conversation, as the fundamental process mediating between structure and agency, also canalised the personal-societal relationship in different directions, according to its mode – thus articulating the precise form of the micro-macro link” (\textit{ibid.}). Such canalization of personal-societal
relationship, or in the present context the relationship of the civil society (reflecting the stance of particular reflexives) with the Party-State, would result in the divergences not only within a movement, e.g. the disarray in the exiled democracy movement, but also between movements. The latter, for instance, can be seen in the contrast between the current state of relationship between the weiquan activism’s assertion and the Party-State’s domination (which while coercive, does exhibit certain degree of tactical flexibility as in the case of the Wukan uprising and the Shifang 什邡 incident) that could at the risk of oversimplification be probably described as “mutualistic symbiosis” (see Figure 9), i.e. to a certain extent benefiting both sides, and the relationship between the exiled democracy movement and the Party-State which – probably with the exception of the particular cases of ethnoterritorial resistance movements which have been able to maintain continued influence on events in the particular territories – could probably be described as “commensalistic symbiosis” (see Figure 4), i.e. a fluid relationship of association yet at the risk of indifference and oblivion, if not, as observed earlier, for the injection of the more focused and better organized element of the Falungong resistance movement. Such divergence of course could not solely be attributed to the mode of reflexivity, but also to a higher degree to the variations in the

Figure 9 State Domination and NVA Assertion: Mutualistic Symbiosis

properties of State domination and NVA assertion, shown by the left and right vertical axes of Figure 4 and Figure 9, which with reflexivity, form a complex nexus of micro-macro, agency-structural factors and influences.

7. Democracy Movement and Weiquan Activism: Towards a Better Synergy?

As postulated by Margaret Archer, at the final stage of the evolvement of reflexivity, “if no ‘fracturing’ has occurred, the three modes of reflexivity are consolidated and become the means through which subjects determine the concrete projects which they seek to advance in a suitable context – if and when one can be located.” (Archer, 2003: 349) Such necessary conflation as applicable to the present analysis of the Chinese democracy movement, weiquan activism and their relationship with the Party-State or at least the more liberal reformist faction within the Party-State and its co-opted intellectuals is shown in Figure 10.

In an eye-catching article “Zhongguo Zhenzheng de Tiaozhan zai Nali 中国真正的挑战在哪里 [Where lie China’s real challenges?] by Yuan Peng 袁鹏, director of the Institute of American Studies at the Academy of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院美国所), published on 31st July 2012 in the overseas edition of the Renmin Ribao 人民日报 (People’ s Daily), rights-defending lawyers (weiquan lüshi 维权律师), dissidents, recusant underground religious groups (supposed to refer mainly to the unregistered, illegal Catholic and Protestant churches outside the government-sanctioned official/“patriotic” churches), disadvantaged groups and leaders of the netizens are grouped as the five types of people acting as the channels through which the United States is infiltrating China’s grassroots to bring about change from bottom up. Besides the timing of the appearance of the article – just prior to CCP’s 18th National Congress – the accusative warning brought back memory of Mao’s “five black types” (landlords, wealthy peasants, antirevolutionaries, bad elements and rightists) during the Cultural Revolution and hence the article’s five categories are referred to by some readers as the “new five black types”. The accusation is ominous, and placing civil rights lawyers at the top of the list could be a warning that State repression would be intensified upon those in the legal profession who dare to defend in court those dissidents that the State is going after or to take up civil rights cases against the routine State persecution in the name of weifwen and hexie. On the other hand, grouping together the different strands of NVA as targets to suppress also reflects a certain degree of concern over the potential threat posed to the one-party State by a better coalescence of the different strands of NVA to form a common front in the pursuit of some transplanted “velvet” or “jasmine” revolution.
7.1. Remembrance of Operation Siskin

An earlier example of how at a critical juncture diverse social forces are galvanized into joint action is the now legendary “Operation Siskin” or “Operation Yellowbird” (黃雀行動). Known as “Secret Passage” at an earlier stage, “Operation Siskin” was a loosely structured Hong Kong-based rescue syndicate hurriedly put together by some key members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會), Hong Kong actors-cum-filmmakers John Shum Kin-fun 岑建勳, Alan Tang Kwong-wing 鄧光榮 and businessman Chan Tat-ching 陳達鈐 in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Beijing massacre. While the United States and Hong Kong’s British colonial government were undoubtedly involved in the rescue missions to various degrees and the costly and highly dangerous operations were financed mainly by Hong Kong businessmen and its underworld among other benefactors, Operation Siskin owed much to the organizing strengthen and network of the Hong Kong underworld, mainly the smuggling triads, which successfully rescued more than 300 to 400 wanted student leaders, democracy activists, scholars and writers, mainly from June to the end of 1989, but with sporadic operations.
lasting till June 1997, just before the “Handover” of Hong Kong to China.\textsuperscript{95}
For the protection of lives and careers, many details including the identity of those involved have remained unrevealed, but during the past two decades, most of the well-known figures in the Operation and various other possible participants\textsuperscript{96} have since passed away, including Szeto Wah 司徒華, chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China from 21st May 1989 till his passing on 2nd January 2011 and a member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council from 26th September 1985 to 12th September 2004, Alan Tang Kwong-wing, singer-actress Anita Mui Yim-fong 梅艷芳, and the Hong Kong democrat Leung Wah 梁華 whose mysterious death in neighbouring Shenzhen 深圳 was alleged by some to be the work of Chinese security agents.

While Operation Siskin represents a brazen joint effort of a response at a critical juncture in the yesteryear which is slowly fading into a figment of collective memory, some recent events have brought back vividly that manifestation of a localized “people power” in bringing about breakthrough not only in relatively short-term \textit{weiquan} but also in the implication for the long-term democratization of Chinese politics. The most outstanding of such recent events is the Wukan incident.

\subsection*{7.2. Wukan, Shifang and Their Implications}

The Wukan crisis first erupted in September 2011 at a time when not only in the Tibetan region or other ethnic regions (where of course a vein of interethnic misunderstanding and scapegoating has been added) but all over the country, public resentment is pushed to the boiling point by the brazen exploitation and brutal suppression of dissent in a mode of development that serves mainly to enrich the corrupt local officials and CCP élites and their business cronies. Among the recent cases of partially successful backlash against such State-business collusion (\textit{guan-shang goujie} 官商勾结 under the cover of the “hard principle of development” at the expense of the interest of the local people) that attracted worldwide attention are the two most outstanding incidents of Guangdong’s Wukan and Sichuan’s Shifang.

The three-month long Wukan protests first erupted after the villagers’ realization in September 2011 that the village’s last and largest piece of land had been sold off by the village’s officials led by Xue Chang 薛昌, the village’s Communist Party secretary for the past 40 years, who allegedly had been secretly selling off the village land through the Wukan Harbour Property Development Company which was set up in December 1992 and of which Xue Chang was the statutory representative – more than 6,700 \textit{mu}\textsuperscript{97} out of a total of 9000 \textit{mu} of village land had been sold off by the time the protests erupted – which was followed by the death of the village
representative Xue Jinbo in police custody in December with a badly bruised body – truly the straw that broke the camel’s back. On the other hand, the Shifang protests erupted after a petition of over a hundred students in front of the party offices against a molybdenum copper factory project in July 2012 swiftly escalated into a student-led 20,000-strong demonstration which ended with the government announcing the abandonment of the proposed project based on environmental and public health concerns. Within the same month, a second demonstration, involving over 10,000 people, erupted in Qidong 启东, Jiangsu, similarly led by post-90 generation students, against a project for a Japanese-invested paper factory to drain waste water into the Yellow Sea, in which demonstrators occupied the government building, leading to the government announcing the cancellation of the project. Back in Guangdong, apparently emboldened by Shanwei 汕尾’s Wukan protests, over 30,000 people, also led by students, demonstrated in the Haimen 海门 township of Shantou 汕头 city against the government’s plan to build a second highly polluting coal-fired power plant – highlighting their sufferance both in terms of high cancer rate and diminishing fishery produce as the result of severe pollution since the building of the first such power plant in Haimen in June 2006 – and clashed with the police. Likewise, over a thousand peasants also walked the streets in another Shantou village, Shangdaimei 上岱美 of the Xinan 溪南 township, on 18th December 2011, and a similar number of villagers also demonstrated on the same day in Lufeng 陆丰’s Longtou 龙头 village – in an unending stream of desperate protests against official corruption and exploitation of peasants’ interests, severe pollution and especially land requisition without fair compensation. Such aspects of social injustice accompanying the country’s high economic growth have led to widespread public protests including numerous cases of self-immolation (the most recent cases, besides the series of Tibetan self-immolations that shock the world, include the alleged self-immolation of a villager in Huidong 惠东 county of Guangdong’s Huizhou 惠州 on 17th October 2012 due to land dispute and accusation of official corruption98) and other forms of suicide.

While admittedly not all forms of social protests are seen as system-threatening and ironically some that at first look seem to be system-threatening may instead work for the ruling regime’s advantage (Yeoh, 2011: 439-444, 481-483), the intensification of public protests all over the country (e.g. 19 incidents of public protest just within three days from 17th to 19th October 201299) has serve to demonstrate the level of despair in facing the onslaught of oppressive State-business collusion in the name of economic miracle and national glory so lauded by the upper classes and co-opted intelligentsia both domestic and among the Overseas Chinese communities, with similar accusation by death still spreading among the Tibetans in the ethnic Tibetan
regions of China unceasingly in protecting against similar oppression. While such problems are well understood by the central government, there does not seem to be any way out of the quagmire that is trapping at least over 620,000 villages all over China, according to a *New York Times* analysis\(^\text{100}\), where rapidly rising land prices are encouraging both village cadres and higher-tier officials to abuse public office to engage in rent-seeking activities at the expense of the villagers in a gargantuan, complex nexus of interest entanglement, both horizontal and vertical. At the same time, the village committee elections system, so lauded by many observers as a bold step of grassroots democratization, has ironically worsened official corruption and “backdoor” practices for such village elections are seldom really free or fair, and independent candidates unendorsed by the Party are continuously being blocked from standing, harassed or even brutalized, while the election process is being easily manipulated.

In terms of their very nature, such incidents like those in Wukan and Shifang are in no way unique among the myriad of cases of the so-called “mass incidents” (the government’s euphemism for public protests and demonstrations) all over the country happening sometimes at an average rate of one case per week. Since the village committee re-elections that the Wukan people were finally allowed to do, albeit probably unique in its free and fair way, are legal within the village committee election system practiced currently in China, there was nothing so outstanding in this too. What is rather unique lies in the amicable resolution of the crisis when the government decided to refrain from cracking down but acquiesce in accommodating the demands of the protesters. In this particular case of Wukan, cannot be ignored is the fact that the villagers are protesting to the provincial government to *zuozhu* 做主 (enforce justice) against the misdeeds of the village party secretary and officials and the intra-village family-clan factional power abuse, that the Guangdong province, being the pioneer province chosen by Deng Xiaoping in his experimental “reform and open” policy since the late 1970s, tops the country’s regions in terms of economic openness and has a government led by the Communist Party’s Guangdong Committee Secretary Wang Yang 汪洋 who is known to belong to the relatively liberal faction of the party\(^\text{101}\) despite his repressive actions towards Guangdong’s media which has greatly tarnished his otherwise liberal reformist image\(^\text{102}\), and that this village of the Lufeng city, part of the Hailufeng 海陆丰 region that is reputable among the Chinese for it doughty folkways, carries the historical halo of being a “red” revolutionary stalwart region of the CCP\(^\text{103}\) have in combination led to the rather surprising mode of resolution of the confrontation, even after the Siege of Wukan has brought about the premonition of the Wukan conflict ending in a fate reminiscent of the Shadian massacre in 1975.
Table 7 Progress of Events in Wukan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22nd September 2011</td>
<td>Finding out that land in Wukan has been secretly sold off by village officials, 4,000 people attacked government building and police station of Lufeng City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th December 2011</td>
<td>Wukan villagers clashed with police while marching towards the government building of Lufeng City. Villagers’ representative Xue Jinbo and four others were arrested. Xue Jinbo died three days later while in police custody, causing situation to turn acute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th December 2011</td>
<td>Guangdong’s deputy party secretary Zhu Mingguo 朱明国 set up working group to deal with the Wukan incident, agreeing to the villagers’ three demands: 1) return village land; 2) return Xue Jinbo’s body and release the other villagers still in police custody; and 3) recognize the temporary committee of village representatives as legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st December 2011</td>
<td>Guangdong provincial party committee agreed to re-election of Wukan’s village committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st February 2012</td>
<td>Election assembly was held in Wukan and elected an 11-member village election committee by one-person-one-vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th February 2012</td>
<td>A total of 109 village representatives were elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th February 2012</td>
<td>Shanwei City returned Xue Jinbo’s body to his family and gave condolence and funeral money of 900,000 yuan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd March 2012</td>
<td>Village committee re-election in which villagers’ leader Lin Zuluan 林祖銮 was elected as the village committee director.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “六十年第一次大陸烏坎民主選舉” [First time in 60 years: democratic elections in Wukan on the Mainland], 聯合報 (United Daily News/UDN, Taiwan), 4th March 2012.
7.3. Problems of Political Opportunity Structures and Formation of Collective Identity

But when I open the door to step out into the world, there’s only a tremendous void. A pale gray nothingness that is all my future holds.

Suzanne Collins (2010), *Mockingjay* (The Final Book of *The Hunger Games*), Chapter 12

Political opportunity structures refer to State strategies such as repression, co-optation, as well as NVA strategies of assertion, forming of alliances, etc., many of which and the problems involved have been discussed earlier over Figures 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8. In urging NVA activists to “face the hard truth” that a liberation struggle “is a time for self-reliance and internal strengthening of the struggle group”, Gene Sharp lists four immediate tasks: strengthening determination, self-confidence, and resistance skills; strengthening the independent social groups and institutions; creating a powerful internal resistance force; developing a wise grand strategic plan and implementing it skillfully (Sharp, 2010: 7-8). Such problem of the construction of a strong collective identity – a “We” – has always been a issue plaguing the Chinese exiled democracy movement, as observed earlier, and also a potential problem in the attempt to bring about a synergy of different strands of NVA. Internal squabbling and clash of egos constitute a long-running problem of Chinese NVA which has long lacked a unifying figure who would serve to bring solidarity – a Lech Wałęsa, a Václav Havel. Examples of instances of such internal discord have been numerous, and those mentioned below are just some recent, prominent ones which might in a larger context look irrelevant but their relatively high profile due to the personalities involved could serve to highlight such long-running problems. On the contrary, other examples involving heart-rending individual tragedies resulted from State oppression and injustice could serve as a galvanizing factor for NVA resistance though again, the concrete results from the rippling effects might take time to actualize.

7.3.1. A potentially crippling law suit and the “forgiveness” controversy

In contrast to the cases of bravery witnessed in the scene of the domestic democracy movement and *weiquan* activism which, against all odds, have continued their struggles to survive with a remarkable extent of solidarity in the harsh domestic environment, the often worryingly pathetic state of disarray that the democracy movement in exile has fallen into is probably epitomized by two recent high-profile examples. The first is the potentially bankrupting multiple lawsuits the exiled former “general commander” of 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations Chai Ling 柴玲 has brought against the non-profit organization that created the acclaimed documentary film *The Gate of*
Heavenly Peace, the main indictments leveled against whom centre around its distortion of Chai Ling’s views resulted from montage and sequential editing. After the court dismissal of her initial defamation lawsuit, Chai Ling has filed an additional suit against the filmmakers claiming that the mentioning of Jenzabar at their non-profit organization’s website constitutes copyright infringement. Whether the continuing lawsuit represent a vengeful dissatisfaction against the filmmakers’ response about a month later which denied any misrepresentation or ill intent and emphasized that they too felt that any attack on Chai Ling’s character resulted from watching the film is most unfair, wrong and regrettable as one should understand the unimaginable heavy toll those turbulent months of intense pressure on Tiananmen Square had taken on the top student leader who was on the brink of mental collapse but they have presented the facts without any distortion or ill intent, or are there really no other more rational approach on both sides to attempt a more amicable resolution of this confrontation, this lawsuit plainly reveals the pathetic state of fragmentation, disarray and loss of emphasis that have befallen the democracy movement in exile. Such internal strife and disarray is also evident, for instance, in Feng Congde’s Liu-Si Riji (A Tiananmen Journal) published in 2009, one of the latest first-hand account of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and Beijing massacre in print, whose postscript and chapter notes reveal a dismal web of scapegoating, intrigue, clash of egos, personal agenda and even insinuations of planted moles and agents provocateurs.

In addition to the lawsuit, another controversy has recently been aroused after Chai Ling’s declaration on the 23rd anniversary of the June Fourth massacre that she had forgiven Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, as well as the PLA, who were held to be responsible for the massacre, following her embrace of the Christian faith in recent years. Her forgiveness apparently did not find endorsement from other exiled survivors of the massacre, with Wang Dan, who later in the year published his memoir From June Fourth to Exile, issuing an “urgent statement” that despite respecting her opinion based on her new faith, he absolutely cannot concur with such forgiveness from the victims which he considers as baseless and an affront to justice for the martyrs of 1989 and subsequent persecution, while the murderous regime, still continuing its brutality and butchery, has not shown an inkling of penitence and remorse, and that the world should recognize this forgiveness strictly as the personal view of Chai Ling who is in turn urged to make a correct distinction between personal religious faith and the judgment of right and wrong. Örkesh Dölet (Wu’erkaixi) in his statement on 6th June, “Wo Wufa Yuanliang 我无法原谅” [There’s no way that I could forgive], declares that although eventual reconciliation – leaving the past and embracing the future – is the common aim, he cannot forgive the murderous
regime before the rectification of the wrongs, before the repentance of the sinners who committed the atrocities of 1989, before the responsibility for the massacre is finally affixed, and he “would like to kindly remind Chai Ling that if we identify ourselves as members of the 1989 democracy movement, we have no right to forgive.”

There are other harsher statements from pro-democracy activists calling Chai Ling a “traitor” to the cause, who also point out that to forgive the dead villains is to encourage their successors to continue their brutality and while the model of replacing violence with violence is to be rejected, the time of forgiveness can only arrive after the villains have lost their ability to continue their brutality.

While the squabbling is in many ways reflecting the long-running rift within the exiled democracy movement, doubtlessly it also stemmed from the untimeliness and tactless innocence of the “forgiveness” declaration. However, one has to be fair to the former student leader of the Tiananmen protests, who at a tender age was thrust into a selfless role of leading the most groundbreaking democracy movement that contemporary China has ever witnessed, and who has endured unending pressure from the formative years of a young student through the past two decades of exiled life, being demonized not only by a brutal regime against whom her movement vainly put up a lone, forlorn and foredoomed struggle largely unaided and unadvised, not least by a forever submissive and petrified academe. Adding to this the dismal experience of a factionalized exiled movement bending more on playing the blame game rather than an objective understanding of the inevitable limitations of the student-led movement of 1989 and its protagonists, seeing such absolution as a bridge to national reconciliation is psychological understandable. That said, Wang Dan’s “urgent statement” in response does brought to mind the late Christopher Hitchens’ query in his iconoclastic book *The Missionary Position* that by what rights one assumes the power to forgive and note that there “are even some conscientious Christians who would say that forgiveness, like the astringent of revenge, is reserved to a higher power” (Hitchens, 1995: 88). Hitchens was, of course, talking about the Mother Teresa phenomenon. The particular episode he was referring to here is the Union Carbide factory explosion that spilled toxic chemicals in the Indian town of Bhopal that instantly killed two and a half thousand people and permanently damaged the health of many thousands more with the lung-searing emissions during the mishap. While the “subsequent investigation revealed a pattern of negligence and showed that previous safety warnings at the plant had been shelved or ignored […] a shocking case of callousness on the part of a giant multinational corporation”, Hitchens noted

> At the [Bhopal] airport, greeted by throngs of angry relatives of the victims, [Mother Teresa] was pressed to give her advice and counsel, and she did
so unhesitatingly. I have a videotape of the moment. ‘Forgive,’ she said. ‘Forgive, forgive.’

(ibid.: 87)

Hitchens went on to give his searing comments:

On the face of it, a strange injunction. How did she know there was anything to forgive? Had anybody asked for forgiveness? What are the duties of the poor to the rich in such a situation? And who is authorized to recommend, or to dispense, forgiveness?

(ibid.)

As well said by Paul Turley, the Deputy District Attorney for Los Angeles, in his letter to Mother Teresa, in reply to the latter’s letter to the court seeking clemency for Charles Keating who was to be convicted in one of the greatest frauds in American history, as reproduced by Hitchens, “divine forgiveness is available to all, but forgiveness must be preceded by admission of sin […] No church, no charity, no organization should allow itself to be used as salve for the conscience of the criminal. We all are grateful that forgiveness is available but we all, also, must perform our duty […] We are urged to love mercy but we must do justice.” (ibid.: 69-70; italics in the original)

Albeit admittedly based on noble intentions, a declaration of forgiveness amidst continued brutal repression and injustice could reasonably be interpreted as a betrayal of the inevitable obligation of those who live on in exile and who can only continue to fight injustice with the pen on behalf of those who died by the sword in Beijing in June 1989, those who have remained behind to face continued persecution by a ruthless State and both those who lost and those who risked their lives embarking on the breathtakingly heroic rescue of the wanted in 1989 in the now legendary Operation Siskin. Needless to say, the declaration of forgiveness could be untimely too. The untimeliness was manifested evidently in at least two shocking incidents immediately before and after the 23rd anniversary of the June Fourth massacre.

7.3.3. The despair of Zha Weilin

The first is the suicide of Zha Weilin 轧伟林, a member of the Mothers of Tiananmen group led by Professor Ding Zilin 丁子霖 whose son, like the children of all other members, was killed by the PLA during the June Fourth massacre. After 23 years of fighting for justice on behalf of his younger son Zha Aiguo 轧爱国 who was shot dead by the PLA in the night of 3rd June during the crackdown and suffering from repeated police threats and surveillance, Zha Weilin left home and was found to have hanged himself in a yet-to-open underground car park on 25th May 2012 at the age of 73.
The police cordoned off the area, took away his body and had it cremated on 27th May. Zha’s wife and elder son said that they had persuaded Zha not to kill himself, after finding sometime earlier a suicide note in which Zha had written his name and work unit and stated his decision to fight for justice with death after more than two decades of petitioning the government in vain. In its obituary for Zha, the Mothers of Tiananmen group strongly condemned the government’s inhumanity and urged it to immediately return the suicide note, which had been presumably confiscated by the police, to Zha’s family.113

7.3.4. The indomitable spirit of Li Wangyang

However, the most shocking incident at around the 23rd anniversary of June Fourth massacre has to be the suspicious death of long-imprisoned activist Li Wangyang 李旺阳. A glass factory worker who was first arrested in 1983 for organizing the Mutual Aid Association of Shaoyang Workers (邵阳市工人互助会) under the influence of the first Beijing Spring (西单民主墙) and Poland’s Solidarność, and who during the tumultuous months of 1989 organized and chaired the independent workers’ union of Shaoyang city (邵阳市工自联) and led workers’ demonstrations in support of the students’ protests in Beijing, Li was arrested on 9th June 1989 immediately after the Beijing massacre and jailed for 13 years for “anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation” and released on 8th June 2000 blind and deaf and in extremely poor health, after enduring long years of beating and torture in jail114, but was soon jailed again in 2001 for 10 years for “subverting government institution” and under continued surveillance upon release in May 2011.

Though looked terribly frail and having lost both sight and hearing and most of his teeth (many were broken by prison guards who force-fed him during his hunger strike in jail), the indomitable Li gave an impassioned and heart-rending video-recorded interview, broadcast in Hong Kong on 2nd June 2012 just prior to the 23rd anniversary of the 1989 massacre, in which he condemned the inhuman regime that tortured him and reiterated his continued commitment to fighting for multi-party democracy in China, and that “there’s no looking back even if they chop off my head”.115 On 6th June, two days after the massacre anniversary and four days after the broadcast of his interview, Li was found dead, ostensibly having hanged himself on the hospital room’s window frame. The police took away the body, and against the family’s objection, cremated it three days later. Doubts have been raised regarding Li’s “suicide”116, and in a show of mockery, many weiquan activists, including Hu Jia, Xia Yeliang 夏业良, Wang Lihong 王荔蕻, Wu Gan 吴淦, Hua Chunhui 华春辉, Chen Yunfei 陈云飞, etc., were soon issuing declarations of the following manner: “I shall not commit suicide
under whatever circumstances and in case of my death which the police say to be suicide, I definitely have been ‘suicided’ (bei zisha 被自杀). As in the case of Chen Guangcheng’s escape, Li Wangyang’s family, who have been under long-term persecution including his sister who was incarcerated after giving a telephone interview to the Voice of America\textsuperscript{117}, friends and other weiquan associates were silenced, “disappeared”, threatened, or placed under house arrest or close surveillance in the subsequent drive to contain the issue, while it is widely believed, as expressed by the guilt-stricken reporter who interviewed him, that the interview aired on 2nd June, in which he not only showed his indomitable defiance against the one-party State but also revealed the details and extent of inhuman torture inflicted upon him by the prison guards, could have led to his death.

On the other hand, the image of Li Wangyang broken by long years of beating and torture and his suspicious death also brought into the limelight the plight of those still in jail since participating in the demonstrations 23 years ago. According to the San Francisco-based watchdog Dui Hua Foundation (中美對話基金會), of the 1,602 people thus jailed, seven has still not been released and long years of imprisonment and ill treatment had not only led to a broken body like the case of Li Wangyang but also mental disease, like the activist Yu Rong 余蓉. Li Yujun 李玉君, a hawker who fought the PLA with a burning oil cart during the June 1989 crackdown, who was released in May 2012 after his 23-year long imprisonment, but placed under surveillance for another 8 years, was also said to suffer from mental illness and a broken body after long years of ill treatment and beating in jail.\textsuperscript{118} While the 23-year imprisonment, beating and torture, and ultimately death, of Li Wangyang could be seen to epitomize the fate of Chinese democracy movement and the inhuman extent to which the Chinese State machinery could be used to crush any expression of dissent and defiance, the suicide of Zha Weilin truly symbolizes the increasing dejection and despondency of those struggling to hold on to their principled but forlorn fight for justice in an environment devoid of political morality and decency, where two decades of relentless censorship and GDPism have resulted in the prevalent political apathy, acquiescence and resignation among the citizenry.\textsuperscript{119} On the part of the ruling political élite, could it be that the continued survival of one-party rule has to remain the paramount concern even after the imminent change of leadership post-18th National Congress of the CCP? – while the prime directive of “stability above all else” and the ruthless “dissent-harmonizing” maintenance of a “harmonious society” delineate a safe zone wherein political “seemers”\textsuperscript{120} are continuing to parade administrative innovations as political reforms and political fudge (zhengzhi huyou 政治忽悠) as visionary leadership, in a political regime that has been disillusioned with the once-revolutionary vision of socialist transformation while still struggling
on maintaining the monopoly of political power. Instead of risk-taking revolutionaries and statesmen with conscience and prescience, could it be that holding the helm of this regime has to be some visionless, overcautious risk-avoiding political careerists resplendent in hollow, sentimental rhetoric and showmanship, being both the products and survivors of the yesteryear of Maoist horror and still reeling from the shock of the perceived political debacle of 1989? These are questions that probably the new leadership that is taking over the reins of power soon could not avoid to ponder.

8. Concluding Remarks

We have it in our power to begin the world over again.
– Thomas Paine (1776), Common Sense, Appendix to the Third Edition

From the perspective of interpretivism, change in the forms of interaction, process and negotiation is primal, while structure a by-product and temporary. In this context, both the pro-democracy and civil rights activists on the side of dissidence and members of the ruling political élite on the other are human agencies engaged in the constant creation, negotiation and re-creation of the social order, in an Archerian “double morphogenetic” scenario for agency wherein is found “the progressive expansion of the number of Corporate Agents, of those who are counted among them and of the divergent interests represented by them, which thus results in substantial conflict between them” (Archer, 2000: 267). Within this process of social change there exists a negotiated consensus about what constitutes objective social reality – an outcome of the historical process of symbolic interaction and negotiation that is society as social construction because human agencies, be they State agencies or civil societal groups or organizations, become real only if the human agents believe that they are to be real, significantly in the context of “a complementary shrinkage of Primary Agents, due in part to their mobilisation to join burgeoning promotive interest groups and in part to the formation of new social movements and defensive associations, as some of them combined to form novel types of Corporate Agency” (ibid.), be they, in the present context of State and dissent, the Falungong resistance movement with its dynamic media outlets and cultural troupes, or the weiquan activism with its legal aid bodies or informal support groups on the side of NVA, or the existing and emerging factions of princelings, youth league, tuanpai or other intertwining factions and cliques on the side of the Party-State.

In huge and complex societies with a multitude of contending realities whatever consensus on what constitutes objective social reality is at best partial – an environment which the corporate agency seeks to control and yet being constantly reconstituted by the responses of the primary agency
that also necessarily inhabits therein (ibid.: 266-267). This can be seen in the context of the interpretive understanding of social action (verstehen) – the Weberian focus on human agents’ interpretation, definition and shaping by cultural meanings well beyond overt behaviour and events wherein human agents define their social situations, while these definitions influence ensuing actions and interactions and such human interactions entail the negotiation of order, structure and cultural meanings. It is in this context that the primary agency “unleashes a stream of aggregate environmental pressures and problems which affect the attainment of the […] promotive interests” of the corporate agency which thus, in turn, has two tasks to undertake, i.e. “the pursuit of its self-declared goals, as defined in a prior social context, and their continued pursuit in an environment modified by the responses of Primary Agency to the context” which the latter confronts (ibid.: 267) – the primary vs. corporate agential turbulence that is continuously unfolding in the present context on both sides of the NVA-Party-State “political jujitsu”, whether they be the tumultuous intra-Party struggle that led to the fall of Bo Xilai 薄熙来 or the personal interest- or orientation-induced internal disarray of the NVA, whether they be an innocent expression of forgiveness at the wrong timing or overzealous enforcement of weiwen at the local level, even over a blind man, yet not unrelated to factional strife at the centre. After all, this is the inevitable outcome of the process of the integration, at the level of the individual human agent, of subjective projects and objective circumstances in a viable modus vivendi linking structure with agency, through constantly examining one’s social contexts, asking and answering oneself in a trial-and-error manner about how one can best realize the concerns that oneself determines, in circumstances that were not one’s own choosing (Archer, 2003: 133).

Adapting Walter Frederick Buckley’s concepts of morphostasis referring to “those processes in complex system-environment exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organization or state” and morphogenesis referring to “those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, structure or state”, Archer (1995), on the other hand, posits that humanity has entered the stage of the morphogenetic society and speaks of the central importance of the role of the human agency that generates both the social segments’ morphostatic and morphogenetic relationships which, in turn, are not able to exert causal powers without working through human agents. It is clear that while Archer’s double morphogenesis sees both structure and human agency as conjoint products of interaction, upon the praxis between operating structures and purposely acting human agents, agency is constantly shaped by structure which in turn is being reshaped in the process. Hence, it needs to be noted that amidst the dynamic interplay of such an array of critical socioeconomic factors that underlie the surging currents of sociopolitical change, be they the overt
or subliminal emergent changes that tend to act to subvert the stability of well laid-out projectable changes envisaged by the ruling regime (Yeoh, 2010a) or an illusive transformative change biding its time prior to a critical point of bifurcation as pointed out by the chaos theory (ibid.; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), the role of the individual as a catalyst for change cannot be underestimated, even if the long-term impact of the individual’s action is not immediately explicit and the lone crusade involved does not receive adequate sympathy of the wider public. Such is the tragedy of the commons (à la Hardin, 1968) resulted from incomplete feedback loops, among others.

On the other hand, shocking it might have been, it was not surprising that the 1989 Beijing Spring had ended in the tragic Rape of Beijing when the system segments’ relations did not mesh with those of the human agents. Such poignancy results, in Archer (1988)’s explanation, from the disjunction between the system segments’ relations of contradictions and complementarity and those between human agents in terms of conflict and cooperation. This same mismatch that is still manifesting itself today where the political élite in the life-world are adamant in holding ground against the masses’ demand for transformative political change amidst lively debate and consensus on universal values at the general level of the cultural system – thus nipping morphogenesis in the bud, leading to the subsequent protracted morphostasis. Ironically, the duality of structure and agency pointed out by the structuration theory implies that there exists a symbiotic relationship between structures that shape agencies’ motives into practices and agencies whose routine practices in turn create structures. None can exist without the other. For instance, the huge, heroic showing of “people power” in 1989 and its brutal crushing by a ruthless State “were of such magnitude that they continue to reverberate in people’s imagination and the collective memory – and in the sleep of party leaders and officials, as a nightmare”, commented Benton (2010: 322), “The experience of facing down the government created a generation no longer prepared to act as an off-stage army for party factions, an attitude passed on to the protestors’ children. Although most of the 1989 generation have stopped being active, some continue to work for political and social change. The Chinese democracy movement in exile has survived in the current harsh environment and there have been many attempts to organize a political opposition in China, for example, the establishment of the China Democracy Party in 1998.” After all, individuals, who together form social movements, are at the very foundations of all socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes. However, in comparison with the different waves of almost a century of Chinese dissent, as pointed out by both Benton and Wasserstrom, today’s dissent in China lacks a unifying thread that connects the actions of different disgruntled groups (Wasserstrom, 2009), partly due to the actions of the regime, partly also being “a result of the increasing complexity,
differentiation, and individualization of Chinese society, which is no longer monochrome and predictable but as diverse as other contemporary societies, and geographically even more diverse” (Benton, 2010: 322). This increased diversity has inevitably impacted on the increasingly complex structure of the agent-institution interface (see Green’s model of social change as applied to the Chinese case – Green, 2008; Yeoh, 2010a: 271, Figure 19) at the core of the circles of social, including sociopolitical, transformation.

On another note, while the uncanny tale of two blind men – Li Wangyang and Chen Guangcheng – stands to symbolize the mix of agony and hope of the Chinese democracy movement and weiquan activism, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2012 from house arrest (which she was placed under most of the time during the past two decades), with her political rights restored, upon the sudden, surprising democratic reform across the border in Burma has undoubtedly given so much hope to the long-persecuted pro-democracy and weiquan activists in China and the democracy movement in exile since the June Fourth massacre. The concern over the potential danger of the turn of events in Burma to the Chinese regime through a demonstration effect was apparently behind the recent self-criticism the weekly Nanfang Renwu Zhaokan 南方人物周刊 was ordered to make after publishing an interview article on Aung San Suu Kyi in its 13th February 2012 issue. Nanfang Renwu Zhaokan is one of the publications of Nanfang Media Group (南方报业传媒集团) which also include Nanfang Dushi Bao 南方都市报 (Southern Metropolis Daily) and the weekend Nanfang Zhoumo 南方周末, all of which are well known to be relatively vocal among China’s media. The muzzling of these media outlets prior to the 18th National Congress of the CCP has represented a main blemish upon the Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang’s otherwise liberal reformist image.

Nevertheless, in contrast with Burma, it is a fact that contemporary Chinese dissent and NVA suffer from a lack of leadership – the lack of a “centre”, an Aung San Suu Kyi. While the Tibetan resistance movement has its 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, and its Uyghur counterpart has Rebiya Kadeer, there is no single figure in the democracy movement for the exiled democracy activists or their counterparts within China to coalesce around – neither Liu Xiaobo, nor Wei Jingsheng, nor any of the exiled former Tiananmen student activists or former labour leaders like Han Dongfang. Neither is there any such figure among the relentlessly harassed weiquan activists in the country. Chen Guangcheng’s indomitable spirit underlined by his disability and accentuated by his incredible escape might make him the much needed symbol of struggle but he is now also exiled, with little hope of return. That said, while the lack of solidarity and a united front may make the movement look weak or even pathetic, but the fragmentation could also have the potential of being turned into an advantage. After all, democracy is and
has to be a messy business, in contrast with an authoritarian system – a “China model” as such – where decision making is usually very much facilitated by the existence of a strongman or a party that monopolizes political power by force. “You pays your money and takes your choice”, as Aldous Leonard Huxley says in his 1946 foreword to *Brave New World* (1932). On the other hand, the lack of a central figure of leadership aside, stranded in faraway lands, the exiled former Tiananmen student leaders do have an advantage on their side – age. They can wait. They could take wrong actions, make unwise statements, be at loggerheads with each other but that could also add to the impression of innocence and lack of guile like that characterized their 1989 effort, in sharp contrast to the craftiness and deviousness of the unfeeling regime they stand to challenge. For all the tears shed at natural calamity sites, for all the photoshoots that were splashed across newspaper front pages of the loving human face of the Party, a grandpa who is indifferent to, even if not directly taking command of and directing, the inhuman brutality meted out to the labour activists who were rotting away in jail for two decades in prisons across China, to civil rights defenders, to victims of State-business collusion, to the Li Wangyangs who were being “suicided”, is a grandpa from hell. Finally, if Aung San Suu Kyi and her seemingly doomed Burmese democracy movement could still witness a change of tide after two decades of repression, it would be difficult to try to seal the fate of the equally long repressed Chinese democracy movement and hit a final nail in its coffin within the institution-agent-event-context interface in the long and arduous process of contemporary Chinese political institutional change (see Figure 11). The stake is simply too high for the fate of over 1.3 billion people – one fifth of humanity. In this regard, the present predicament of both the Chinese democracy movement, exiled and domestic, and the *weiquan* movement is probably best summed up in Her Peirong (“Pearl Her”)’s homepage motto: “I persevere, therefore I am” (*Wo cheng gu wo zai* 我撑故我在).

**Notes**

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Figure 11 Chinese Political Institutional Change: Institution-Agent-Event-Context Interface

Demographic factors - age advantage of the exiled Tiananmen student leaders, the “post-90” generation’s perspective, backlash to continued brutal enforcement of one-child policy, new 5th and 6th generation of CCP leadership less encumbered by the legacy of 1989 massacre to effect change, ethnic diversity and ethnoregional disparity …

Globalization – global linkages providing democracy activists, exiled and domestic, platform and international support including funding, globalization, outlook of new generation of CCP leadership, global economic interests of CCP leaders and their family …

Cultural factors – destruction of traditional culture under Maoist radicalism blamed for society’s ethical deterioration and cultural vacuum, CCP’s exploitation of Confucianism including the use of Confucian Institutes, lack of democratic tradition in long history of imperial China, poverty and low cultural level of masses, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist legacy, Dengist stance against trias politica …

Technological factors - IT advancement a double-edged sword that provides more space for free speech (e.g., e-media, facebook, twitter) and better surveillance by the State …


Environmental factors – environmental calamities and scandals are increasingly becoming the focus of weiquan activism despite the usual violent State suppression (e.g. the controversy still surrounding Three Gorges Dam construction and relocation of 1.2-1.7 million people, 2009’s Sichuan earthquake and “tofu dregs” school-house scandal, Sanlu milk scandal, 2011’s Inner Mongolian demonstrations against Han mining interests’ destruction of Mongolian grazing grassland, demonstration by thousands in Lufeng, Guangdong Province against water pollution related to official-business collusion and the students-led demonstrations involving twenty thousand in Shifang, Sichuan, against a molybdenum copper factory project in July 2012 …

Source: Based on Green (2008).

1. Or more officially, the “Communist Party of China” (CPC).
2. 维稳 (maintaining stability).
7. See a recent WikiLeaks’s revelation of a telegraph from Shanghai’s American consulate to Washington in October 2007 (ODN, 5th August 2012). Current news items in this paper, unless otherwise stated, are sourced from 东方日报 (Oriental Daily News/ODN), a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.
8. Public grievances against such frenzied quest for GDP growth with little regard for human and environmental consequences have led some Chinese netizens to translate GDP mockingly as “gou de pi 狗的屁”, meaning “dog’s fart”.
10. Although the scope of China’s economic decentralization goes far beyond decentralization in public finance, but even measured solely by the latter, China has been said to be the world’s most economically decentralized country (Xu, 2008: 187-188) given that China’s local public spending has since the mid-and late 1980s been steady at about 70 per cent of her total national public spending, whereas in federal countries such as the US, Germany and Russia, the proportions of local public spending in total national public spending are only respectively 46 per cent, 40 per cent and 38 per cent. From the angle of central-local economic relations, China is also one of the most, or to some, even the most economically decentralized countries in the world, with most parts of resources controlled by the local governments, including the allocation of land, energy and financial resources (*ibid.*: 187). In fact, one of the characteristics of China’s economic decentralization is the relative self-sufficiency of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level. The local governments are fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local economic development, and for the legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Such a characteristic not only
marks China’s economic institution apart from a central planning economic system, but also makes her local governments more powerful in competences than the local governments in most federal countries in the world. (*ibid.*: 188)

11. Recusance or recusancy is defined as “nonconformity” or “refusal to obey or conform, especially in religious matters”, and a recusant is as used here, aside from its English history-related religious sense, “a person who refuses to obey or conform to an established authority or its regulations” (see *Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language*, unabridged, second edition, New York: New World Dictionaries/Simon and Schuster, 1983). “Recusant” is an adjective meaning disobedient of authority (especially in religious matters), or dissenting or nonconformist.


15. ‘Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one […] man] finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least’, said Thomas Paine in the beginning paragraphs of *Common Sense* (1776).


17. “Not only is Peking a nightmare streetscape awash in atrocity and anguish; the nation at large has become a haunted land. This howling, lurching mega-ghost is the Chinese Communist Party. In one staggeringly brutal stroke, it shot itself through the heart. It will not recover. A regime that professes itself to be the distillation of popular will has turned on the Chinese people, committing the ultimate sacrilege of eating its own children. Hundreds of China’s brightest, most idealistic sons and daughters, their movement commanding wide public sympathy, were nakedly sacrificed to the cause of preserving an élite.” (*Asiaweek*, 16th June 1989, p. 16, editorial: “The Rape of Peking”)

18. Not a first-time nominee, Gene Sharp, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, heads the annual nominee shortlist of Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) director Kristian Berg Harpviken in 2012. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/nobel-peace-idINDEE81Q0HL20120227>

19. Charter 08, signed in December 2008 by over three hundred prominent Chinese citizens, was conceived and written in emulation of Charter 77 founded in former Czechoslovakia in January 1977 by over two hundred Czech and Slovak intellectuals, including the future Czech president Václav Havel. Charter 08’s number of signatories, local and overseas, later increased to about 7000
by March 2009 (ODN, 14th March 2009). Liu Xiaobo, the leading dissident arrested and jailed, also played a prominent role in the 1989 Tiananmen 天安门 demonstrations and hunger strikes. Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence.

20. Li’s survey also found that as high as 73.66 per cent of respondents stated non-participation in any non-governmental organizations (NGO). In an interview by the Voice of America, Hu Xingdou 胡星斗, a professor of economics at the Beijing Institute of Technology (北京理工大学), opined that the proportion should correctly be 99 or 100 per cent due to the basic fact that the presently so-called “NGOs” in China could hardly be recognized as NGOs because Chinese law demanded government linkage or dependency for an “NGO” as such in most parts of the country, hence strictly speaking there were no real NGOs in China (Voice of America, as reported in ODN, 16th July 2012).


22. “In developing our democracy, we cannot simply copy bourgeois democracy, or introduce the system of a balance of three powers. I have often criticized people in power in the United States, saying that actually they have three governments. Of course, the American bourgeoisie uses this system in dealing with other countries, but when it comes to internal affairs, the three branches often pull in different directions, and that makes trouble. We cannot adopt such a system.” – Deng Xiaoping, “Take a Clear-Cut Stand against Bourgeois Liberalization”, 30th December 1986. <http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol3/text/c1630.html>

23. See Yeoh (2010a) for its adaptation for the Chinese context.


25. Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, Part First (1794). An antithesis of Archer’s “metareflexives” is an amoral State which can be benevolent or malevolent depending on which suits its paramount, overriding ultimate objective of self-perpetuation – a Bonapartist regime par excellence. The CCP is a party born on ideological ground devoted to the Marxist vision of social justice, but just like its Soviet counterpart, after becoming a personal tool of Mao (like Stalin in USSR) – an inevitable result of the Marxist trust in the “Dictatorship” of the proletariat – and the collapse of the Marxist ideology (due to economic failure) with the disintegration of USSR and Deng Xiaoping’s coup de grâce, what has emerged is an ideological vacuum while party leaders have been acting more like political careerist rather than visionaries. All that counts now is how to perpetuate the Party’s rule, and to protect the élite’s – including the family members’ – spoils. If it pays to uphold the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “socialist democracy” banner, if it pays to go capitalist and to jump on the GDPism bandwagon, if it pays to appease the people by
punishing the local officials (like in Wukan), or if it pays to further silence the victims and whistle blowers – all actions are possible as far as they work in favour of maintaining the one-party rule in a truly utilitarian manner.

26. *Jujutsu* 柔術 is a Japanese martial art of close combat, using no weapon or only a short weapon, for defeating an armed and armored opponent.

27. As pointed out by the chaos theory (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).

28. Ni Yulan was a lawyer before she was permanently crippled in the legs after being savagely beaten up while in police custody in 2002, lost her lawyer’s license and became unemployed and homeless, for fighting on behalf of herself and other affected residents against forced demolition to make way for the Beijing Olympics. She has since become a prominent *shangfang-weiquan* 上访维权 activist and was sentenced in 2008, just before the Olympics, to two years in jail. This indomitable *weiquan* activist in crutches had refused to be intimidated and was arrested for a third time in 2011. She was sentenced in April 2012 to two years and eight months in prison and her husband to two years *(ODN, 29th June 2010, 29th January 2012, 10th April 2012)*.


32. At that time she began an Internet donation campaign to provide the two jailed activists’ families 1500-2000 yuan monthly for subsistence, as she has also been long doing for other incarcerated activists. She then turned her attention also to the plight of Chen Guangcheng and his family, and made six trips to Linyi 临沂’s heavily guarded Dongshigu 东师古 village to attempt to visit Chen, despite being warned repeatedly by the *guobao* 国保 (national security officers) in Nanjing of the danger and knowing well that other activists including Hu Jia 胡佳 and Wang Keqin 王克勤 had been beaten up by the guards while trying to do so. Others who had been roughed up in their attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng include the Hollywood actor Christian Bale who, accompanied by CNN reporters, tried to reach Chen’s residence on 15th December 2011.

33. Chang’an Jie 长安街 (literally “Street of Eternal Peace”), the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen 天安门 square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989.

34. The persecution against Muslims there included forced cutting off of beards and plaits, tearing off of scarves, annulment of halal canteens at offices, schools, factories and mines, tearing down of halal signs at Muslim restaurants and in some place even forcing Muslims to eat pork, forced changing of Islamic funeral practices and canceling of Muslim festivals. For example, in Ningxia’s Muslim county of Haiyuan 海原 a total of 67 mosques, 3 gongbei 拱北 (sacred tombs) and 17 temples were demolished just within three to four days, a “plait station” was set up in Guyuan 固原 county for the force cutting of all women’s
plaits and in Helan county 3,009 Muslim women had their scarves torn away (Jin, Yu and Chen, 2006: 402-403).

35. This involved profane deconsecration of mosques, burning of the Qur’an, beating and humiliating imams and devotees, forcing Hui Muslims to mimic pigs and to lick swine heads during brutal denunciation sessions and beating to death and maiming (Gao, 2008).

37. ODN, 13th July 2012.
38. ODN, 19th November 2012.
40. “Provinces” here refer to the country’s 31 sheng 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑龙江, Henan 河南, Hubei 湖北, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山西, Sichuan 四川, Yunnan 云南 and Zhejiang 浙江), zizhiqu 自治区 (i.e. “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 内蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi 直辖市 (i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing 北京, Chongqing 重庆, Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津).
43. Such a policy option can be due to the dominant group’s perception of the subordinate group/groups as “exotic” rather than “real” (Hoetink, 1973: 177-91).
44. The fact that ethnicity was more territorially based in Croatia than in Bosnia shows the significance of the pattern of settlement – regional concentration or intermingling – in determining the type of minority movement.
45. The dominant group may perceive a subordinate group as “exotic” rather than “real” (Hoetink, 1973: 177-91). An example of such an “exotic” minority is the small Gente Kristang community (autoglossonym, from Portuguese “Gente Cristã”) in the state of Melaka in Malaysia descended from the 16th century Portuguese settlers and occupiers. Defined as “deviating in somatic and/or cultural respects, without being conceived subjectively as a menace to the existing social order” (Hoetink, 1967), “exotic” groups (or Cox’s (1948) socioracial “strangers”) are not perceived as “real”, because they are not subjectively comprised within the “societal image” of the dominant. Thus they do not attract the latter’s hostility, as do “real” subordinate groups viewed as a menace. The case of the Ainu and the Burakumin in Japan and that of the
Amerindian natives and Afro-Americans in the United States today are good examples of these two polar subordinate situations – the Ainu and Amerindians being in some way viewed as “exotic” vis-à-vis the other two “real” minorities; instead of bitterness and hostility, they are met with “a mild benevolence, a condescending philanthropy” on the part of the dominant society (Hoetink, 1973: 179). Such distinction between the two types of subordinate groups was vividly described by DeVos in his study of the Burakumin: “The basic attitudes held [by the dominant Japanese society] toward the Ainu are not as pejorative as towards the outcasts [i.e. the Burakumin] [...] the Ainu have been treated ambivalently very much as the American Indians have been, in contrast to the caste distinctions which underlie the treatment of American blacks.” (DeVos, 1972: 326)

46. Paradoxically, China’s largest minority, the Zhuang, could actually be more “exotic” than “real”. Being the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang’s ethnic consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central Communist State in the early 1950s (see, for instance, Kaup, 2000).

47. O’Donnell and Schmitter opines that a transition from authoritarian rule could produce a democracy, but it could also terminate with a liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9, cited in Diamond, 2002: 24). While shadows of the remnants of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are already telling signs that the continuing transformation from a dictadura (dictatorship) into a dictablanda leading further to a highly restrictive democradura in the near future is the most possible direction the CCP regime is heading to and indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, “bourgeois liberal” democracy (democracia) has already been ruled out of the cards, or at least not until mid-2000s. In fact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46, see Bo, 2009: 10-11). This is in line with what Deng Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after half a century had passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to make do with indirect elections above the county level and direct elections only at county and below county level, given the colossal population and inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 19-20, cited from 《邓小平文选》第3卷, 人民出版社1993年版, 第220～221页).

48. The story of Chen’s dramatic escape actually began when he was put under house arrest in 2005 following his involvement in the legal cases of women’s forced abortion and sterilization in the prefecture-level city of Linyi 临沂 in Shandong Province. The blind rights-defending lawyer and activist was formally charged in 2006 with the destruction of public property and traffic disruption and sentenced to four years and three months in prison. Though he was released on 9th September 2010, he and his family have since been under tight round-the-clock house arrest and complete seclusion. After the publicizing of an image recording he secretly made of his house arrest ordeal, Chen and his
wife Yuan Weijing 袁伟静 were cruelly beaten up by seventy-odd people who broke into their house on 18th February 2011, according to a letter sent out by Yuan. The terrorizing and intimidation continued, she said, with their windows being sealed up with iron sheets on 3rd March, television antenna broken on 7th, and the intrusion of forty-odd people who took away their computer and certain handwritten materials. According to another weiquan activist Liu Shasha 刘莎莎, Cheng Guangcheng’s 6-year-old daughter Chen Kesi 陈克斯 was denied her right to schooling because of her parents’ house arrest although she had reached the school age. (*ODN*, 18th June 2011, 5th September 2011).


50. Later, after her release from a week’s custody, for perfectly understandable reasons, He Peirong would deny anybody’s involvement in helping Chen escape. Instead, she said, Chen, a blind man, had somehow been alone through the 17 to 19 hours of escape through the village, until she picked him up when he emerged, after being contacted by Chen’s wife.


52. “Let the hexie spirit transcend the confrontational spirit of the three generations of conventional human rights, to cultivate and produce a new generation of human rights – the hexie rights (rights of harmony). Hexie rights will become the foundation stone and key element of the building of the hexie shijie (harmonious world). 以和谐精神超越传统三代人权的对抗精神，将化育出新一代人权——和谐权。和谐权将成为和谐世界建设的基石和要素。” (See “法学专家徐显明提出第四代人权 ‘和谐权’”, 中国新闻网/腾讯网, 22nd November 2006 <http://news.qq.com/a/20061122/002038.htm>.)


55. For instance, in a recent case in Malaysia, much publicized after the related video clips were uploaded onto Youtube, local Falungong followers were subjected to the rudest verbal abuse including death threat, according to what was recorded on the video clips, when they were trying to submit a letter to the administration of a local Chinese college run by the country’s United Chinese School Committees’ Association (Dong Zong 董总) which earlier, like the umbrella body for Malaysian Chinese associations Hua Zong 华总, also issued a statement in 2010 condemning the award of that year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo (see “谴责诺委会含不良政治意图 董总：和平奖成了世界笑柄” [Condemning Nobel Prize committee as having bad political intention, Dongzong said the Nobel Peace Prize had become the world’s laughing stock], *Duli Xinwen Zaixian* 独立新闻在线/Merdeka Review, 20th October 2010 <http://merdekareview.com/news/v2/news_15335.html>; “陈友信：中方以友人身份提点 隆雪华堂对晓波获奖意见分歧” [Tan Yew Sing (president of the Kuala Lumpur & Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall): China side gave suggestions as a friend; divergence of opinions within KL & Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall towards Liu Xiaobo being awarded Nobel Peace Prize], *Duli Xinwen Zaixian* 独立新闻在线/Merdeka Review, 30th October 2010 <http://www.merdekareview.com/news_v2.php?n=15492>), after a student experimental
newspaper’s license renewal in June 2012 was blocked by the administration following the paper’s report in its March issue on a local Falungong promotion parade. In the video clips, respected Chinese community leaders were seen wrying away pamphlets from the peaceable female Falungong representatives and tearing them into pieces while hurling insults like “hanjian 汉奸” (i.e. Chinese traitors betraying China) and “American ‘running dogs’ (zougou 走狗, i.e. stooges) attacking China”. (See Yong Sun Yong 杨善勇, “Huajiao Hufa Dazhan Falungong 华教护法大战法轮功” [Chinese educationist custodians battled Falungong], ODN, 1st September 2012 <http://www.orientaldaily.com.my/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=22139:&Itemid=202>; also see coverage and related video clips (“法轮功组织欲交公开信至董总主席遭华教人士奋力阻止” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDHC0hCd-4I>, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8UGof5nt7o>) in Li Zhen 李甄’s article “Malaiyxia Huajiao Jie Renshi Fa Kongbu Yanlun 马来西亚华教界人士发恐怖言论” [Malaysian Chinese educationists issued terror statements] at Kan Zhongguo 看中国 [Look at China], 28th August 2012 <http://www.secretchina.com/news/12/08/28/464656.html>. See also coverage in news article “Dongzong Ju Jiejian Falungong Daibiao 董总拒接见法轮功代表” [Dongzong refused to receive Falungong representatives] with the rough outburst from the community leaders against the peaceful Falungong representatives related under vivid subheading “Huhe Ruma Qugan 呼喝辱骂驱赶” [Shouting verbal abuse, hurling insults and chasing away], ODN, 25th August 2012, p. MC2; 叶家喜, “Xinwen Ziyou Meng Yinying 新闻自由蒙阴影” [Pall over press freedom], ODN, 27th August 2012, p. MC6.)

57. ODN, 8th November 2010.
58. According to Reuters and Hong Kong’s Apple Daily (蘋果日報) respectively.
59. “我要把这个横行霸道、张牙舞爪的河蟹撕掉、吃掉!” (ODN, 9th November 2010) If one could allegorically liken today’s CCP to the monk Fahai 法海 in the classical Chinese legend Lady White Snake (Baishe Zhan 白蛇传) who ruthlessly imposed a monopoly of his cosmic value upon the society in his relentless persecution of the dissenting couple of the kind and indomitable white snake and her human paramour, is the present overarching “harmonious society” political rhetoric not in some way analogous to the crab in which Fahai had sought sanctuary from the fury of dissension represented by the counterattack by the white snake after her rescue from the Leifeng Pagoda (Leifengta 雷峰塔) by the little green snake, according to a variant of the myth? Legend also has it that the crab has walked sideways since Fahai sought sanctuary in it – a unique behavioural trait that gave rise to the popular Chinese adage: “Let’s keep a cold eye on the crab; see how much longer it can continue to walk sideways (i.e. to brutally tyrannize over people)” (Qie jiang lengyan guan pangxie, kan ni hengxing dao jishi 且將冷眼觀螃蟹, 看你橫行到幾時). For the Chinese dissidents who feel such repugnance and yet so vulnerable in facing the pressure “to be harmonized” (bei hexie 被和谐) by the Party-State’s “harmonious society” campaign, the aforesaid legend and adage, coupled ironically with Deng Xiaoping foreign policy advice for China to “Lie low and
bide your time” (tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦), could probably provide some comfort.

60. For instance, Ai Weiwei suffered a head injury from an attack by the police who broke into his Chengdu, Sichuan, hotel room at 3 a.m. on 12th August 2009 to stop him from acting as defendant’s witness for a court case of “inciting subversion of State power” against his fellow dissident Tan Zuoren 谭作人 (whom he had worked together to compile a full name list which the State has tried to suppress as usual, of the huge number of schoolchildren who died during the Sichuan earthquake that led to the exposure of the insidious “tofu-dregs schoolhouse scandal” that rocked the nation), for which he underwent a brain surgery in Munich in 2009 (Groupe Radio France Internationale/法国国际广播集团, 14th September 2009 <http://www.rfi.fr/actucn/articles/117/article_16123.asp>).

61. ODN, 9th November 2010

62. Reflecting such admiration are, among others, recent influential works by renowned Western China scholars like Martin Jacques (When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, London: Allen Lane, 2009) and Ezra F. Vogel (Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., 2011). Herein also lies the danger of the current fashionable glorification of the “Beijing Consensus” (à la Joshua Cooper Ramo, 2004) and a “China model”. Chinese democracy movement is not a domestic affair of this huge nation of 1.3 billion people who constitute one fifth of humanity. The increasing influence and acceptance of the so-called Beijing Consensus and “China model” is tantamount to a subliminal universal acceptance of a political authoritarian, repressive model of development where economic advancement takes unquestionable precedence over liberal democracy, free political choice, free speech and human dignity. The also currently fashionable so-called “soft power” (à la Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 1990, 2004) projection of China includes such politico-cultural outposts like the Confucius Institutes and Confucius classrooms, but language teaching and learning is never purely about language, for it inevitably embodies the inculcation of not only cultural values but subliminal political brainwashing through textbooks (including what is omitted in them) and “cultural immersion programmes”. Similar concern over the subliminal universal acceptance of political authoritarianism can be seen in the 2009 Nobel Literature Prize laureate Herta Mueller’s recent description as a “catastrophe” the 2012 award of the Prize to Mo Yan 莫言 whom she criticized as “celebrating censorship”. (ODN, 26th November 2012. Mo Yan, who in 2011 joined a group of authors to transcribe by hand a 1942 speech by Mao Zedong on how art should serve communism – a speech that began decades of government control over Chinese writers and artists, is the vice-chairman of the State-run Chinese Writers’ Association.) However, in the latest ranking of countries by soft power according to the British magazine Monocle, it seems that China, not being ranked among the top 20, would still have some way to go. According to this latest investigation by Monocle on soft power based on government standard, diplomatic facilities, cultural exports, educational capability, business environment, etc., topping the
list this year is the United Kingdom, followed by the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and South Korea (*ODN*, 20th November 2012).

63. Translated from Bao Tong’s introduction in Zhao (2009b), pp. 33-34.

64. See Bo (2010: 117).


66. On China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines.


68. Indeed, building upon the foundation set by the Hu-Zhao administration’s audacious reformist programmes, Deng Xiaoping moved forward from where his purged former protégés have left by reinvigorating the post-Tiananmen chilling politico-economic milieu through his “southern tour” (*nanxun 南巡*) in 1992, culminating lately in China first superseding Germany to become the world’s third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the United States of America and Japan, and finally superseding Japan in mid-2010 to become the world’s number 2. According to a report published on China’s National Bureau of Statistics website on 14th January 2009, the confirmed 2007 GDP of China at current prices amounted to 25.7306 trillion yuan, an increase of 13 per cent from the previous year (*ODN*, 16th January 2009). While observed to be still short of a third of US’s GDP, analysts had predicted China’s GDP to overtake Japan’s in three to four years, just as it overtook the United Kingdom and France in 2005 and Germany in 2008. Nevertheless, according to an announcement by Yi Gang 易纲, the director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the deputy governor of China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, on 30 July 2010, China had already superseded Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010. However, in terms of GDP per capita, Japan’s (US$37,800) was more than 10 times that of China (US$3,600) in year 2009, and Japan’s GDP per capita ranking, while having dropped from world’s number 2 in 1993 to number 23 by 2008, was still far ahead of China’s which ranked beyond 100 (*ODN*, 9th August 2010).

69. See taxonomy in Diamond (2002: 30-31), Table 2.

70. See Yeoh (2010a: 285), Figure 21.

71. See Yeoh (2010a: 271-272), Figure 19.

72. Referring to Deng’s well-known gradualist dictum “Cross the river by groping the stones” (*Mo zhe shitou guo he 摸着石头过河*).

73. *Lianhe Zaobao* 联合早报 (Singapore newspaper), 19th July 2012.

74. Largely seen to be presently represented in the centre mainly by the still influential Jiang Zemin faction, though the real power configuration could be less simple.

75. Largely seen to be presently represented by the Wen Jiabao faction, though again, the real power configuration could be more delicate.

76. Feng Jianmei, who was married from Inner Mongolia to Shaanxi in 2006, began her second pregnancy in late 2011. On 30th May 2012, while she was alone at home, over 30 staff from the family planning centre surrounded her house, followed by three-day round-the-clock house arrest enforced by close to 50 guards. However, Feng finally managed to escape into the hills but was
caught by the guards on 2nd June, who proceeded to wrap her head in clothes, beat her up and forcefully carried her to the county hospital. Instantly the family planning centre staff contacted her husband who was working in Inner Mongolia, asking him to pay a 40000-yuan fine for above-quota childbirth (chaoshengfei 超生费) – “40000, not even one cent less”, according to a short message text received by her husband which he later showed to the media. The husband agreed to pay but was unable to do it immediately; so after one hour of waiting the officers proceeded to press a pillow on Feng’s face and carried her to the operation table, forced her to sign and give her fingerprint, and a doctor gave an injection to kill and expel the seven-month old baby in her womb. (ODN, 15th June 2012)

77. ODN, 27th June 2012. Ironically at the same time when this woman from a peasant family was being victimized by such inhuman State coercion, the nation was basking in the glory of sending into space for the first time a woman astronaut, Liu Yang 刘洋.

78. ODN, 11th July 2012.
79. ODN, 11th July 2012.
80. ODN, 5th August 2012.
81. 大紀元時報 (The Epoch Times (Malaysia)), Special Issue, June 2012.
84. See Yeoh (2010a: 298), note 51.
86. According to a 30th April 2012 Reuters report (see Hai Tao, 2012); see also report in ODN, 17th November 2012.
87. “Yi Liyi Biaoda Zhiduhua Shixian Shehui de Changzhijiu'an 以利益表达制度化实现社会的长治久安” [Realizing society’s long-term governance and stability by institutionalization of interest expression], cited in “Gonggong Anquan Zhangdan 公共安全账单” [Bill of public security], Caijing 财经 [Finance and economics], 9th May 2011.
88. ODN, 17th November 2012.
89. Ibid.
91. Garnaut citing a disillusioned “princeling” and former PLA colonel, Chen Xiaolu 陈小鲁, son of one of China’s 10 great marshals, Chen Yi 陈毅.
95. See “黄雀行動背後港人捨命救危內情” [Inside story of how Hong Kong people risked their lives to embark on rescuing those in danger behind the Operation Siskin] by Jiang Xun 江迅, originally published in Yazhou Zhoukan 亚洲週刊, Issue 23, 14th June 2009; reproduced in Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012.

96. Referring to personalities reportedly to be involved, but unconfirmed, in the covert operation in some way, whether in terms of direct organization and operation, financial support or otherwise.

97. 1 mu 亩 = 0.0667 hectares.

98. ODN, 21st October 2012.

99. Occurring in Foshan 佛山, Shenzhen 深圳, Guangzhou 广州, Huizhou 惠州, Shangrao 上饶, Qingdao 青岛, Changchun 长春, Taiyuan 太原, Sanya 三亚, Zhongshan 中山, Shanwei 汕尾, Ningde 宁德, Hefei 合肥, Xuzhou 徐州, Shijiazhuan 石家庄, Chengdu 成都, Nanping 南平, Beijing 北京 and Wuhan 武汉, some resulted in severe clashes between protesters and police (ODN, 21st October 2012).

100. ODN, 29th December 2011.

101. As compared to, for instance, the hardliners-affiliated Shandong government that persecuted Chen Guangcheng.

102. ODN, 1st November 2012.

103. Like the standing of Ai Weiwei’s father, the “red poet” Ai Qing 艾青 in the eyes of the CCP leaders and stalwarts.

104. The former Tiananmen student leader who fled China in April 1990 after ten months of hiding after the massacre, moved on to acquire an MBA from Harvard Business School in 1998 and founded a software company Jenzabar in the same year, has brought the lawsuits on the ground that the documentary has maliciously insinuated that she has sacrificed her fellow student demonstrators for personal gain. Many student leaders and activists exiled since the massacre has come out in support of Chai Ling, including her former husband Feng Congde 封从德. Feng escaped with her to France after the massacre, moved on to acquire a master’s degree in 1996 and PhD in 2003 from École Pratique des Hautes Études, and founded in 2001 the “June 4th Memoir: On Beijing Massacre 1989” / “Liu-Si Dang’an 六四檔案” (64memo.com) website that documents the history, research information, audio-visual reports and first hand accounts of the June Fourth Beijing massacre. Others who came forward to support Chai Ling are Fang Zheng 方政 of the Beijing Academy of Physical Science at the time of the demonstrations, whose legs were crushed by tanks in the morning of 4th June during the massacre; Zhang Jian 张健 also of Beijing Sports University, who was shot three times on Tiananmen Square during the massacre; Xiong Yan 熊焱 of Peking University who was on Chang’an Avenue attempting to block the rampaging army and, like Chai Ling and Feng Congde, whose name is on China’s Most Wanted list for the 21 Tiananmen Square Protest leaders; Zhou Fengsuo 周锋锁 of Tsinghua University who was also on the 21 Most Wanted List and who was among the last batch of students to leave the Tiananmen Square on June Fourth; Cheng Zhen 沈真 of Beijing Normal University and Pan Qiang 潘强 of Shandong University who
were also among the last batch of students to leave the Square; writer Zheng Yi 鄭義 who was an organizer of Beijing intellectuals’ demonstrations during the Tiananmen days and escaped in 1992 after hiding for three years after the massacre; another Tiananmen Square activist Yang Jianli 杨建利 who later moved on to acquire two PhDs from Harvard University (in political economy) and University of California, Berkeley (in mathematics), and who was later the vice-chair of the Alliance for a Democratic China and founder of the Foundation for China in the 21st Century; Zhang Boli 张伯笠 who was on the 21 Most Wanted List and who managed to escape from China after hiding for two years after the massacre. Also included among those who stood up to defend Chai Ling are Yan Jiaqi 严家祺 who was formerly political advisor of Zhao Ziyang and a leading intellectual supporting the 1989 student movement, fled to Paris after the massacre and was involved in forming the Federation for a Democratic China and was elected its first president, and was a member of the Chinese Constitutional Reform Association and has suggested the formation of a Federal Republic of China; and Wang Dan 王丹 who was on the 21 Most Wanted List, arrested in July 1989 after the massacre, sentenced in 1991 to 4 years but released on parole in 1993, then re-arrested in 1995 for conspiring to overthrow the CCP and sentenced in 1996 to 11 years but released on medical parole to the United States in 1998, moved on to acquire a master’s degree in East Asian history in 2001 and a PhD in 2008 from Harvard University, and became the chairman of the Chinese Constitutional Reform Association. These prominent pro-democracy activists and Tiananmen veterans, together with many others, in an open letter of 28th May 2009 to the filmmakers of the documentary, Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon, called for the rectification of the misleading portrayal of Chai Ling through their selective quotes from her poignant “last will and testament” recorded on 28th May 1989, with the help of an American student cum free-lance reporter Philip Cunningham, that insinuated Chai Ling’s intention to flee, as well as interpretive and erroneous translation especially surrounding Chai Ling’s use of the term qidai 期待 by which they believed she meant yuqi 預期 or dengdai 等待, i.e. anticipate or wait (for the imminent bloodshed) but was misleadingly translated in the film as “hope for” (see “八九天安門運動幸存者、参与者和支持者致紀錄片《天安門》制片人卡玛•韓丁和理察德•戈登的公開信”, 28th May 2009 <http://www.64memo.com/d/Blog/HostsBlog/tabid/229/EntryId/12/.aspx> / “Open letter of Tiananmen survivors, participants, and supporters to Carma Hinton, Richard Gordon, Director and Producer of the Gate of Heavenly Peace”, 28th May 2009 <http://www.64memo.com/d/Default.aspx?tabid=97>). Carma Hinton (or Han Jing 韩倞) is a documentary filmmaker and Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Visual Culture and Chinese Studies at George Mason University, United States. Philip J. Cunningham is today professor of media studies at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan.

105. See Feng Congde’s “Xianshen yu Qiusheng de Mimang: Dui Yingpian Tiananmen Shiliao Genju de Zhiyi 献身與求生的迷茫 —— 對影片《天安門》史料根據的質疑” [Perplexed between sacrifice and survival: querying the basis of the film Tiananmen’s historical material], written on 7th May 1997 at


110. *ODN*, 7th June 2012.

111. “[...] 我无法在正义是非得到匡正之前原谅，无法在被害人原谅他们之前原谅！也想善意提醒柴玲，我们如果认同自己八九民运一分子的身份，我们就无权原谅。和解是我们所追求的目标，期待终有一日，我们可以放下过去、拥抱未来，但那一天的到来首先需要的是对于真相还原不懈的努力，正义伸张不懈的努力，首先需要的是追究责任，首先需要的是罪人的忏悔 [...]” <http://wuerkaixi.com/>, 6th June 2012.


113. *ODN*, 29th May 2012; “Tiananmen Muqin Qunti Fugao 天安门母亲群体讣告” [Obituary by Mothers of Tiananmen], 27th May 2012, from Mothers of Tiananmen (天安门母亲群体), posted by Ding Zilin 丁子霖 (see *Bajiu Yidai Tongxun* 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012).

114. The torture of Li Wangyang included the use of the inhuman undersized handcuffs and pincers and repeated solitary confinement (sometimes for as long as three months) in the dark, hot, smelly and lice-, fly- and mosquito-infested “coffin cabin” of just 2 metres x 1 metre x 1.6 metres and being long shackled with rusty fetters weighing over 50 kilogrammes that caused terrible festering and ulceration from ankles to haunches, according to the Hong Kong-based 中国人权民运信息中心 (ODN, 14th June 2012).

115. http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=IK47hlQtCQ0

116. Such doubts include the fact that the death scene photographs show that Li’s legs did not leave the floor and his hand was on the window frame, the white bandage strip around Li’s neck was not tightened and the loop was too small to fit his head, Li’s face showed no distortion and there was no trace of struggle as
often with hanging, where the white bandage had come from as the bed sheet and blanket were not torn, how a blind and deaf person who could hardly walk without help managed to tie the strip on the window frame and on his neck to successfully commit suicide and how he did manage to commit suicide under the watchful eyes of as many as nine guards that night, whether it was the purpose of the hospital to let Li’s family see him having hanged himself the reason that it had chosen to notify the family first instead of taking him down urgently to resuscitate him, and whether the police was trying to hide something by urgently wresting his body away from his family.


118. ODN, 4th June 2012, 7th June 2012, 8th June 2012, 9th June 2012, 10th June 2012; 11th June 2012; 13th June 2012; Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012; “关于要求严肃调查李旺阳死亡真相的紧急呼吁/Urgent Appeal for Credible Investigation into the Truth of Li Wangyang’s Death”, initiated by Hong Kong journalist Bei Feng 北风 (Wen Yunchao 温云超), Peking University’s economics professor Xia Yeliang 夏业良 and scholar of historic documentation (US) Wu Renhua 吴仁华, 6th June 2012 <http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2012/06/201206070601.shtml>.

119. Besides Zha Weilin who killed himself just before the massacre’s 23rd anniversary and Li Wangyang who was suspected of “being suicided” immediately after, Fang Zheng 方政 who went on stage on his wheelchair during the Victoria Park commemoration in Hong Kong which was attended by the largest number ever of 180,000 people also stands to represent a poignant living proof of State cruelty and hypocrisy. A student of the Beijing Academy of Physical Science, Fang Zheng lost both his legs 23 years ago in the early morning of 4th June 1989 in saving a fainted student during their evacuation from the Tiananmen Square from a row of approaching tanks along West Chang’an Avenue. While he successfully pushed the girl out of harm’s way, his own legs were crushed by a tank. Though the authorities had asked him to state instead that he was hit by a car, the gruesome photograph shot by a foreign reporter of his shattered body lying at the crossroads of Liubukou 六部口 stands to symbolize the brutality of the ruthless crackdown and cut through the lies and conceits fostered by the authorities in subsequent decades in whitewashing the unfortunate “incident”. (ODN, 2nd June 2012, 6th June 2012; Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012)

120. To use a Shakespearean term from: “Hence shall we see, / If power change purpose, what our seemers be.” (William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act I, Scene IV)


123. ODN, 23th July 2012.

124. ODN, 1st November 2012.

125. Tenzin Gyatso is the 14th Dalai Lama, who was born Lhamo Dondrub on 6th July 1935. “Tenzin Gyatso” is the shortened form of the religious name “Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso”.
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